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Abstract 
As concerns about the environment increase and civilians continue to become casualties of 
armed conflict, we must reflect on traditional approaches and applications of International 
Humanitarian law [IHL]. While the current state of IHL provides protections for civilians and 
the environment, examples in practice of excessive harms to both suggest a gap exists in 
these protections. Current academic literature in the field tends to focus on either the 
protection of civilians or the protection of the environment, on either IHL or International 
Environmental law [IEL]. This is problematic as the two are inextricably linked: civilians and 
environment often, if not always, go hand in hand. This thesis seeks to close these gaps. It 
begins with an examination of existing IHL and a look at two instances which resulted in 
excessive harms to civilians and the environment. Next, it turns to the role of general 
principles of international law, in particular the precautionary principle and the principle of 
intergenerational equity in IEL, which are well-accustomed to dealing with short-term and 
long-term health and environmental risks, as well as scientific uncertainty. The thesis 
demonstrates how the use of these principles in military decision-making could fill the 
existing gaps in IHL. 
Keywords 
International Humanitarian Law, International Environmental Law, Intergenerational Equity, 
Precautionary Principle, General Principles of International Law 
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Chapter 1  
1The Ever-Increasing Costs of War to Humanity  
1.1 Introduction  
            The protection of civilians and civilian objects has a long history in international 
humanitarian law (IHL). Unfortunately, as the methods and means of warfare have 
evolved and developed, the military and civilian spheres have become increasingly 
intertwined and overlapping. Though IHL long predates World War II, the Battle of 
Britain and the bombings of Dresden are but two instances during that war where 
civilians and civilian objects became the targets of military action. Post-World War II, 
the international community attempted to strengthen the existing laws with the entirety of 
the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 devoted to the “Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War”.
1
 
            In the post-World War II era, human rights and environmental concerns also 
began to take on more prominent roles in international discourse and regulation. 
Nonetheless, despite increased international commitment to the protection of civilians 
and civilian objects in armed conflict, and amidst growing concern for the protection of 
human rights and the environment, the Vietnam War saw the massacre of unarmed 
civilians, such as the My Lai massacre,
2
 and large-scale destruction of forests and 
vegetation through the use of chemical defoliants such as agent orange.
3
 Once again, the 
international community responded with the negotiation and adoption of Additional 
                                                 
1
 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/380. 
2
 For a detailed account of the My Lai massacre see, for example, James Olson and Randy Roberts,eds, My 
Lai: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford Books, 1998). 
3
 For a detailed examination of the use of the environmental damage caused by agent orange and means of 
warfare in Vietnam see, for example, Arthur H Westing, Ecological Consequences of the Second Indochina 
War (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1976). 
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Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 [Additional Protocol I].
4
 This convention 
re-articulated, re-emphasized, and elaborated on the existing protections for civilians and 
civilian objects in international armed conflicts and included two specific provisions 
aimed at the protection of the environment in armed conflict.
5
 Additionally treaties were 
later created which prohibited the use of the environment as a weapon
6
 and which banned 
the use of incendiary weapons in conflict.
7
 
          The trend has been for international responses to harms which exceed the dictates 
of humanity to be reactionary, addressing the harms of the last conflict in the hopes of 
preventing their repetition or reoccurrence in future conflicts. As our understanding of the 
environment and the interdependencies between humanity and nature grows, so do our 
technologies and capacities to wreak serious and irreversible harm to human and natural 
environments not only in the short-term, but for generations to come. As the risks rise, 
the time for wait-and-see and cleaning up after the fact is passing. If the international 
community continues in this reactionary mode, it is increasingly likely that its reactions 
will be too late to undo serious damage already inflicted on the environment, 
communities, and states. 
1.2 Objectives and Scope 
             This thesis aims to address this need to be more proactive to the approach to 
protections for civilians and the environment in armed conflict. It focuses on the rules 
and customs applicable to international armed conflict. While conflict can be identified as 
either international (between states) or internal or non-international (within a single 
state), the rules differ somewhat between the two types of conflict. For example, 
                                                 
4
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3. [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] 
5
 Additional Protocol I, ibid at Articles 35(3) and 55. 
6
 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques (ENMOD), adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res 31/72, 10 December 1976. [hereinafter 
ENMOD] 
7
 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), 10 October 
1980, 1342 UNTS 171, 19 ILM at 1534. [hereinafter CCW Protocol III] 
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Additional Protocol I, which is relied upon heavily in this thesis, applies to international 
armed conflicts and not internal conflicts.  
            This thesis will examine the seeming failure in current applications of IHL to 
adequately protect civilians, civilian objects, and the environment in armed conflicts. 
There appears to be a breakdown in military decision-making that results in questionable 
military action at the cost of civilian lives, livelihoods and environment. For example, the 
continuing use of weapons with high failure rates and the potential for long-lasting harm 
to both human and natural environments does not appear to be adequately considered in 
weapon and target selection. Military decisions on which weapons to use and where and 
when to attack are required to conform to the principles of IHL which demand 
precaution, distinction between civilian and military, and a proportional balancing of 
interests of military necessity and humanity. However, these principles are clearly not 
enough: what is needed is more clarity in existing international legal provisions and 
customs protecting civilians and the environment in armed conflict. If military decision-
makers were provided with clearer legal guidelines for balancing military necessity and 
humanitarian concerns, then they would not be able to hide in the gap that currently exists 
in the ambiguity of the law. Guidelines providing greater structure on considerations of 
the severity of harm, the longevity of consequences, and how to address scientific 
uncertainty would provide additional structure by which to guide decision-making. This 
would also allow individuals, civilians, non-governmental organizations [NGOs], and 
other states to better understand, evaluate and, if need be, challenge the determinations of 
state military actors.  
            These guidelines or markers could inform the application of existing laws for the 
protection of civilians and the environment in armed conflict. However, these do not need 
to be new creations: rather, they already exist in international law. International 
environmental law [IEL] is an existing body of law which prioritizes the protection of the 
environment and human health. IEL principles can, and should, be used to inform the 
interpretation and application of existing IHL. This thesis focuses on two such principles: 
intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle. The former states that, while the 
present generation benefits from the planet and its resources, it is also under an obligation 
4 
 
to preserve the condition of the planet so as to pass it on to subsequent generations in as 
good a condition as it was received from preceding ones
8
. The latter requires actors to err 
on the side of caution where there is evidence of a serious or irreversible risk of damage 
to the environment or human health, even if scientific uncertainty surrounds that risk.
9
 
Together these principles incorporate both short-term and long-term considerations, as 
well as considerations of environmental protection and the protection of human health, 
and attempt to grapple with scientific uncertainty in an effort to protect the environment 
from rash and unmeasured action. Technological advancements are occurring at such at 
pace that sometimes they risk outstripping humans’ abilities to know the consequences of 
their actions before they have been taken. Intergenerational equity and the precautionary 
principle mandate taking a moment to consider the full extent of the consequences of 
actions to avoid a realization after the fact that these actions have irrevocably damaged 
the environment and endangered human health.  
            These principles also have strong ties to the concept of sustainable development, 
which is “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”
10
 This entails the preservation of 
natural resources for future generations, the sustainable or appropriate exploitation of 
natural resources, the use of natural resources equitably between states, and the 
integration of environmental concerns and considerations into economic and 
developmental planning.
11
 Sustainable development also provides a strong link between 
the environment and armed conflict, as conflict inherently creates an obstacle to 
                                                 
8
 See Weiss, Edith Brown. In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and 
Intergenerational Equity (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc, 1989). [hereinafter Weiss 
(1989)] 
9
 See e.g. James Cameron, “The precautionary principle: Core meaning, constitutional framework and 
procedures for implementation” in Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, eds, Perspectives on the 
Precautionary Principle (Sydney: The Federation Press, 1999) 29.  [hereinafter Cameron (1999)] 
10
 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future [Brundtland Report] 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1987) at 8. [hereinafter Brundtland Report] 
11
 Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, with Adriana Fabra and Ruth MacKenzie, eds, Principles of 
International Environmental Law, 3d (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 207. 
[hereinafter Sands et al.] 
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development. Development is about production and creation, while conflict is about 
destruction. Clearly, conflict inhibits, or perhaps undoes, development. The destruction of 
infrastructure and the natural environment are detrimental to health, education, and the 
continued development of societies. For example, approximately 40 million school-age 
children do not attend school in conflict-affected and fragile states.
12
 A by-product of the 
protection of civilians and the environment in armed conflict is that it also serves to 
promote the long-term protection and enjoyment of sustainable development. Sustainable 
development is an important component of, and link between, IEL and IHL and will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapter four. However, the prevailing emphasis in this thesis 
will remain on IEL. 
            The objective of this thesis is to advocate for an integrated IEL and IHL approach 
to military decision-making, and to demonstrate the benefits of this approach through two 
modern conflict examples. The first example considered is the use of cluster munitions in 
or near population-dense areas during the 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo. The second 
example explores the use of depleted uranium weapons in the 1991 Gulf War and the 
2003 Iraq War. 
1.3 Sources of International Law 
            This thesis relies upon the sources of international law. Article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) lists the most authoritative sources of 
international law: 
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting 
states; 
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law;  
                                                 
12
 Women’s Refugee Commission, “Ensuring Opportunities for Displaced Youth” available at: 
http://womensrefugeecommission.org/programs/youth. 
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c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations; 
d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions 
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination 
of rules of law.
13
 
             International conventions are binding bilateral or multilateral agreements 
between states and governed by international law.
14
 They are more commonly referred to 
as treaties, but can equally be labeled conventions, protocols, covenants, and acts.
15
 
Treaties can create legal obligations as well as legal entitlements.
16
 The content of the 
treaty is usually the result of negotiations among states or their representatives,
17
 
sometimes with the input of non-state actors such as experts and NGOs.
18
 Once the treaty 
negotiations are complete, the final draft is adopted by the parties and authenticated by 
signature.
19
 States consent to be bound by the treaty once they ratify it in their home state 
and, once the ratification is deposited (usually with the United Nations), they are referred 
to as States parties.
20
 The formation, application and interpretation of treaties is guided 
                                                 
13
 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat 1055, 33 UNTS 993. [hereinafter ICJ 
Statute] 
14
 See e.g. Antonio Cassese, International Law, 2d (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 170. 
[hereinafter Cassese] 
15
 Cassese, ibid. 
16
 Cassese, ibid. 
17
 Gideon Boas, Public International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012) at 56. [hereinafter Boas] 
18
 An excellent example of a treaty with lots of non-state involvement in the negotiating/drafting process is 
the 1997 Landmine Ban Convention, Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 18 September 1997, reprinted in IRRC, No 
320, September-October 1997, pp. 563-578. [hereinafter Landmine Ban Convention] 
19
 Boas, supra note 17. 
20
 Boas, ibid. 
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by their own content as well as the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).
21
 
            Unlike treaty law, which is binding only on parties that have ratified the treaty in 
question, rules of international custom are binding on all states.
22
 For something to be an 
international custom two elements are required: state practice and opinio juris.
23
 General 
state practice normally requires that the practice among states is “both extensive and 
virtually uniform”.
24
 The practice does not need to be universally employed by states, 
rather the key is whether the practice of states is “widespread and representative” of the 
international community.
25
 The second required element, opinio juris, is a more 
subjective element. It requires “that states undertake state practice out of a sense of legal 
obligation”.
26
 For a practice to be custom, it must be widely accepted and followed by 
states and they must be following it because they believe that they are under a legal 
obligation to do so.  
            The next source of international law is ‘general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations’. Generally, the outdated reference to ‘civilised’ is now ignored in 
favour of understanding the source as “general principles of law recognised by the 
community of nations”.
27
 These principles can be sourced from many different places. 
They can be principles general to the domestic law of nations, principles of international 
law generally, principles that represent “general legal standards overarching the whole 
                                                 
21
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 
331 available online at http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3ae6b3a10. [hereinafter 
VCLT] 
22
 Cassese, supra note 14 at 157. 
23
 Cassese, ibid. 
24
 International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v 
Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands), ICJ Reports 1969, p 3, 20 February 1969, at para 
74, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/50645e9d2.html. [hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf 
case] 
25
 North Sea Continental Shelf case, ibid at para 73. 
26
 Boas, supra note 17 at 89. 
27
 Cassese, supra note 14 at 188. 
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body of law governing a specific area”, and so on.
28
 They can also fulfill many functions, 
in particular, filling gaps in international law and aiding in the interpretation of other 
international law.
29
 
            The final sources of international law – judicial decisions and the writings of 
publicists – are noted as “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”.
30
 
These are not binding, formal sources of the law, but rather provide informed and 
influential evidence of what the law might be or as evidence of the development of 
international law.
31
 Even though judicial decisions are not binding in international law, 
“many decisions of the most authoritative courts (in particular the ICJ) are bound to have 
crucial importance in establishing the existence of customary rules, or in defining their 
scope and content, or in promoting the evolution of new concepts”.
32
 
            Finally, there are many international instruments that have no prima facie  
binding effect in international law, but can usually provide guidance in interpreting 
international law, or as evidence of state practice or opinio juris to indicate the formation 
of customary law. These instruments include declarations, voluntary guidelines, United 
Nations General Assembly resolutions, and publications and reports by international 
organizations.
33
 
1.4 Organization of Thesis 
            This thesis consists of seven chapters. This chapter, chapter one, has introduced 
the context, problem, and aim of the thesis. It also provides a basic understanding of the 
sources of international law that will be relied upon in this work. 
                                                 
28
 See Cassese, ibid at 189; Boas, supra note 17 at 106-107. 
29
 Cassese, ibid at 188. 
30
 ICJ Statute, supra note 13 at Article 38(1)(d). 
31
 Boas, supra note 14 at 110-115; Ian Brownlie, Principle of Public International Law, 7d (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008) at 24-25. [hereinafter Brownlie] 
32
 Cassese, supra note 14 at 195. 
33
 See e.g. Cassese, ibid at 196-197. 
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            Chapter two examines the existing conventional and customary international 
humanitarian law which governs international armed conflicts. It focuses first on the 
protections for civilians and civilian objects under the traditional rules preventing 
unnecessary suffering, and limiting the means and methods of warfare, requiring 
combatants to distinguish between civilians and combatants, as well as between civilian 
objects and military objectives. It also discusses the IHL requirements of proportionality 
and precaution. It explores the tension between the key values that are sought to be 
balanced in proportionality assessments: military necessity and humanity. It then turns to 
the few specific provisions which address the protection of the environment in armed 
conflict. Next, chapter two outlines two modern examples in which the environment and 
civilians have suffered serious harms as a result of armed conflict. These examples will 
again be used in chapter six to apply the approach suggested in this thesis. Finally, this 
chapter provides a brief literature review demonstrating what appears to be an arbitrary 
separation of environment and civilians during conflict within academic discourse. 
            Chapter three turns to the source of international law that plays an integral role in 
the approach suggested in the thesis: general principles of international law. This chapter 
examines in great detail the many different understandings and interpretations of this 
source of law. It focuses on the different and very useful functions they can fulfill in 
international law, in particular in the interpretation and application of other rules of 
international law. This is important for the thesis, because the proposed approach relies 
on the use of general principles of international law to interpret and apply existing rules 
of IHL. 
            Chapter four shifts the focus to IEL and examines this body of law and its 
connection to sustainable development. It then explores the first general principle relied 
on in the thesis: the principle of intergenerational equity. The definition, history, 
evolution, and legal status of intergenerational equity are examined. It then examines in 
greater detail applications of intergenerational equity in the context of human rights to 
environmental protection and health. 
10 
 
            Chapter five focuses on the second general principle of IEL relied on in this 
thesis: the precautionary principle. The evolution, definition, and legal status of the 
principle are explored. Particular attention is paid to the key elements of the principle: 
threat of harm and scientific uncertainty. The differences between precaution and 
proportionality under the precautionary principle are examined, and compared to the 
same concepts in IHL. 
            Chapter six intertwines all of the elements introduced in the four preceding 
chapters. It examines the application of IEL in armed conflicts and shows that it does not 
cease to apply once hostilities begin, but remains a consideration for military decision-
makers applying IHL. The chapter then returns to the examples initially outlined in 
chapter two, applying first the specific environmental IHL provisions and, then, the 
proposed proportionality assessment employing the principles of IEL as guiding markers. 
Through these examples, this chapter demonstrates that a proportionality assessment 
carried out using the intergenerational equity and precautionary principles help to 
interpret and inform the provisions on the protection of civilians and civilian objects, 
such as the environment, and would provide increased protection for civilians and the 
environment in armed conflict. 
            Finally, chapter seven provides the conclusion to the thesis. It restates the research 
problem and summarizes the findings. It reiterates that there is a gap in existing 
protections under international humanitarian law for civilians and the environment. It 
emphasizes that general principles of international law are tools which often function to 
unify the law, fill gaps and aid in interpretation. The inextricable link between humans 
and the environment, both in peacetime and wartime, makes principles of international 
environmental law well-suited to take on a unifying, gap-filling, and interpretive role 
under international humanitarian law. The ability of intergenerational equity and the 
precautionary principle to account for serious or irreversible harm, scientific uncertainty, 
and short and long-term risks and consequences provides the guidelines that are missing 
in existing international humanitarian protections. These guidelines can serve to aid in 
military decision-making in order to decrease the instances in which excessive harm to 
civilians and the environment is the outcome of attack. The application of these principles 
11 
 
in examining examples from the Kosovo conflict and the Iraq war support this 
conclusion. The final chapter will then outline and acknowledge the limitations of the 
research, such as the focus only on international conflicts and the consideration of only 
two principles outside of international humanitarian. Finally, avenues for further research 
will be proposed, for example, the applicability of other principles of international law in 
military decision-making and the extension of these strengthening protections for 
civilians and the environment to internal armed conflicts. 
12 
 
Chapter 2  
2 The Current Status of International Humanitarian Law: 
Existing Protections for Civilians and the Environment in 
Armed Conflict  
2.1 Introduction  
            Over the last two hundred years, there has been an evolution and emergence of a 
strong and expansive body of law designed to govern situations of armed conflict when, 
for all intents and purposes, all other order has broken down. Several key themes, or 
overarching principles, dominate this body of law, which is referred to as international 
humanitarian law (IHL). Three important threads running through IHL are: the limitation 
of the means of warfare; the prevention of unnecessary suffering; and the restriction of 
damage to military targets. All three of these threads are interrelated and have 
overlapping areas of concern: this serves to emphasize both their mutual and independent 
importance.  
            This chapter will explore each of these themes in turn. The first theme, the 
limitation on the means of warfare, emphasizes that the means of warfare are not 
unlimited. Rather, restrictions are placed on military actors as to the types of weapons 
they may and may not use in conflicts. The second theme, the prevention of unnecessary 
suffering, seeks to limit warfare so as to avoid the infliction of superfluous harm and 
suffering to both combatants and civilians. It limits military actors to the minimum means 
necessary to achieve victory and protects humanitarian considerations in the conduct of 
hostilities. Third, military actors are restricted to targeting and attacking combatants and 
military objectives. They must at all times distinguish civilians and civilian objects from 
combatants and military objectives. Next, the principles of precaution and proportionality 
will be examined. The former demands that all ‘feasible precautions’ are taken to avoid 
damage to civilian objects and civilian casualties. The latter demands a balancing 
assessment which weighs the military advantage, or military necessity, of an operation 
with the damage that will be inflicted, particularly in terms of incidental, or collateral, 
damage to civilians. Finally, the two key considerations of IHL – military necessity and 
13 
 
humanity – are examined, along with the inherent tension between the two concepts. The 
chapter then turns to the specific provisions in IHL for the protection of the environment. 
While the environment is indirectly protected, as a civilian object, by provisions 
protecting civilians and civilian objects, there are also provisions which directly protect 
the environment in armed conflict. 
            This discussion demonstrates that there are, formally, a great number of 
protections in IHL for both civilians and the environment. Unfortunately, practice 
suggests that these protections are not fully or adequately realized in application. This 
chapter attempts to demonstrate this by outlining two examples from recent conflicts in 
Kosovo and Iraq in which the harms and threats to civilians and the environment seem to 
exceed the boundaries of their IHL protections. The chapter then reviews a selection of 
academic literature that suggests a gap in academic discourse which fails to appreciate 
the inextricable link between humans and the environment. Ultimately, this chapter aims 
to provide the necessary foundation of existing IHL and to identify a problem within 
existing IHL that this thesis will address. 
2.2 Protection of Civilians and Civilian Objects in 
International Humanitarian Law 
2.2.1 Limitation on the Means of Warfare 
            Enshrined in Article 35(1) of Additional Protocol I 1977 is the rule that “[i]n any 
armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of 
warfare is not unlimited.”
34
 That the methods and means of warfare are not unlimited is 
also a widely embraced key tenet of customary IHL.
35
 In its most simple form, the 
limitation on means of warfare is seen in the wide array of weapon ban conventions in 
                                                 
34
 Additional Protocol I, supra note 4 at Article 35(1). 
35
 Christopher Greenwood, “The Law of War (International Humanitarian Law)” in Malcolm D Evans, ed, 
International Law,2d, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 783 at 795. [hereinafter Greenwood] This is 
also stated in Article 22 of the 1907 Hague Regulations on Land Warfare, Convention (IV) Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, 18 October, 1907, 187 CTS 227; 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations]; and, Article 
35(1) of Additional Protocol I, ibid.  
14 
 
existence: from a prohibition on expanding bullets in the Hague Convention 1899
36
 to the 
prohibition of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gasses by Convention in 1925,
37
 to a 
ban on blinding lasers in 1995,
38
 the Landmine Ban of 1997,
39
 and the cluster munitions 
ban of 2008.
40
 These are but a few of the means of warfare subject to specific restriction 
or outright prohibition.
41
  
            While the principle that the methods and means of warfare are not unlimited is 
established law, this does not mean that conventions restricting, limiting or banning 
weapons are always easily adopted. They are often the product of lengthy negotiations 
and not all achieve universal support. The case of landmines, and more recently cluster 
munitions, are prime examples. Both are currently the subject of separate agreements 
prohibiting their use, but many key States are not party to these agreements, such as the 
United States, China, and Russia. These are major world powers and all stockpile, 
produce, and have used cluster munitions in conflict.
42
 In the case of the Landmine Ban, 
the process to create the Convention was well publicized with the support of a great 
number of states and was an important moment for the rise of non-governmental 
                                                 
36
 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899 reprinted in The Laws of 
Armed Conflict: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents, ed D Schindler and J 
Toman (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) 69-93[hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention]. 
37
 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 UST 571, 94 LNTS 65. 
38
 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 13 October 1995, 
United Nations CCW/CONF.I /7. [hereinafter 1980 CCW]  
39
 Landmine Ban Convention, supra note 18. 
40
 Convention on Cluster Munitions, 30 May 2008, CCM/77, available at: 
http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/01/Convention-ENG.pdf. 
41
 Other examples include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological 
Weapons Convention), 10 April 1972, 1015 UNTS 163; 11 ILM 309 (1972); and, the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 
Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), 3 September 1992, 1974 UNTS 45; 32 ILM 800 (1993). 
42
 Human Rights Watch, “Cluster Munitions Information Chart” (2010), available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2010.4.5%20Arms,%20Cluster,%20Info%20Chart
%20Final.pdf. 
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organizations [NGOs], which were integral in championing the cause to a successful 
conclusion.
43
 Unfortunately, not all States chose to become parties to the Convention. 
These non-party states include China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United 
States.
44
 This is of concern because it is estimated that these states have more than 157 
million stockpiled landmines amongst them.
45
 Additionally, their resistance to accept the 
ban could provide a barrier to a customary prohibition developing. It is often the case, 
where States hesitate or refrain from participating in weapons bans, they do so on the 
grounds that the weapon in question has military utility that makes it an essential part of a 
military’s arsenal.
46
 This is an eloquent illustration of a key tension in IHL between 
claims of military necessity and the dictates of humanity. On the one hand, military actors 
want to use whatever means are available to them to achieve military victory. On the 
other hand, the dictates of humanity seek to protect those who do not participate in 
hostilities from the harms of military action, particularly where these military operations 
are, perhaps, excessive. 
2.2.2 Prevention of Unnecessary Suffering 
            The limitation on means of warfare is closely linked to a second thread in IHL: 
the prevention or avoidance of unnecessary suffering. The International Court of Justice 
[ICJ] has referred to the prohibition on causing unnecessary suffering to combatants as 
the second cardinal principle of humanitarian law.
47
 The terms ‘superfluous injury’ or 
                                                 
43
 See, for example, Maxwell A Cameron, Brian W Tomlin, and Bob Lawson, eds, To Walk Without Fear: 
The Global Movement to Ban Landmines (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
44
 ICRC, “Landmine Stockpile Destruction”, (December 2006), available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/legal-fact-sheet/mines-destruction-factsheet-010906.htm.  
45
 ICRC, “Landmine Stockpile Destruction”, ibid. 
46
 For example, during the Kosovo conflict, the United Kingdom and United States defended the use of 
cluster munitions by emphasizing the military utility of the weapon, that they possess “exceptional 
effectiveness against specific types of targets”. See Richard Moyes, “Cluster Munitions in Kosovo: 
Analysis of use, contamination and casualties” (2007) at 25, available at: 
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Cluster%20Munitions%20in%20Kosovo.pdf. [hereinafter 
Moyes] 
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‘unnecessary suffering’ appear extensively in instruments of IHL
48
 and it is firmly 
established in customary IHL that the use of weapons causing superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering is expressly forbidden.
49
 This concept was first codified in Article 
16 of the Lieber Code of 1863, written during the American Civil War, which states,  
Military necessity does not admit of cruelty -- that is, the 
infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for 
revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of 
torture to extort confessions. It does not admit of the use of 
poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a 
district.
50
 
This tenet was first codified in a treaty in the preamble to the 1868 St. Petersburg 
Declaration, which states that “the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the 
sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable” goes beyond the legitimate 
means of warfare.
51
 Now, nearly 150 years later, the concept is solidly established by 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
47
 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, UN 
document A/51/218 at para 78. [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons case] 
48
 Additional Protocol I Article 35(2); Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects, Geneva, 10 October 1980, reprinted in The Laws of Armed Conflict: A Collection of Conventions, 
Resolutions, and Other Documents, ed D Schindler and J Toman (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2004) 179-184 (preamble); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention as amended on 3 May 
1996) United Nations CCW/CONF.I/ 16 at Article 6(2); Landmine Ban Convention, supra note 18 
(preamble); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9*  at Article 
8(2)(b)(xx) [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
49
 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck,  “Practice Relating to Rule 70. Weapons of a Nature 
to Cause Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering” in Customary Humanitarian Law Vol I: Rules 
(Cambridge: ICRC and Cambridge University Press, 2009) online: <http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs> [hereinafter ICRC Study]. 
50
 US War Department, General Orders 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field (1863) [Lieber Code], reprinted in The Laws of Armed Conflict: A Collection of 
Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents, ed D Schindler and J Toman (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2004) 3–23[Laws of Armed Conflict]. 
51
 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. 
Saint Petersburg, 29 November / 11 December 1868 reprinted in The Laws of Armed Conflicts, eds, D 
Schindler and J Toman (Boston: Martinus Nihjoff Publisher, 1988) 102. [hereinafter St. Petersburg 
Declaration] 
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convention and customary law as an inviolable rule of IHL.
52
 It exemplifies efforts to 
protect principles of humanity in armed conflict by limiting the legitimate means of 
warfare to the minimal necessary to secure victory. Such victory should never be 
achieved by inflicting unnecessary cruelty and suffering which serves no purpose and 
provides no additional legitimate benefit to military efforts. 
2.2.3 Restriction to Military Targets 
            The most important thread running through IHL, and the cardinal principle of IHL 
according to the ICJ, is the protection of civilians and civilian objects, with the 
requirement of distinction between military and civilian, combatant and non-combatant 
targets.
53
 The primacy of the principle of distinction represents the overarching and all-
encompassing need in IHL to preserve the principles of humanity from being completely 
subordinated to interests of military necessity. While war may be a chaotic state in which 
traditional law and order have broken down, under this principle, civilians and civilian 
objects are not legitimate targets for belligerents. It is for this reason that IHL bans 
indiscriminate attacks
54
 - this ban will be discussed in greater depth below.   
            The principle of distinction is first articulated in the preamble to the 1868 St. 
Petersburg Declaration, which states that “the only legitimate object which States should 
endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy”.
55
 It 
follows that, if the only legitimate target is opposing military forces, then one must be 
able to distinguish between opposing military forces and other individuals or objects 
which do not fall under that heading. 
                                                 
52
 For example, Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I states “It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles 
and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” 
While Article 13 of the fourth Geneva Convention states that the provisions of Part II are “intended to 
alleviate the sufferings caused by war.” 
53
 Nuclear Weapons case, supra at note 47. 
54
 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4 at Articles 51(4) and (5). 
55
 St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 51 at 102.  
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            The principle of distinction therefore requires that belligerents, or combatants, and 
their military objects be distinguished from civilians and civilian objects. This basic rule 
is codified in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I 1977 and states as follows, 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at 
all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives 
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against 
military objectives.
56
 
Civilian and civilian population are defined in Article 50 of the same Protocol, which 
states: 
Art 50. Definition of civilians and civilian population      
1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the 
categories of persons referred to in Article 4 (A) (1), (2), (3) and 
(6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In 
case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be 
considered to be a civilian.      
2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are 
civilians.    
3. The presence within the civilian population of individuals 
who do not come within the definition of civilians does not 
deprive the population of its civilian character.
57
 
It is important to note that, in Article 50(1), a presumption is created in favour of 
determining someone to be a civilian where there is doubt as to their status. This is 
important because it means that a soldier must be certain of the combatant status of an 
individual before that individual may become a legitimate target of attack. 
            The principle of distinction applies not only to distinguishing between combatants 
and non-combatants, or civilians, but also in terms of objects. Belligerents must 
distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects, with the latter barred from 
                                                 
56
 Additional Protocol I, supra note 4 at Article 48. 
57
 Additional Protocol I, ibid at Article 50. 
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being the subject of attack. Military objectives are defined in Article 52(2) of Additional 
Protocol I, which states:  
 Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far 
as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to 
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use 
make an effective contribution to military action and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage.
58
 
This definition is also a rule of customary IHL, according to Rule 8 of the ICRC Study on 
customary IHL.
59
 Rule 8 does not provide any elaboration on the content of the definition 
found in Article 52(2), though the commentary on Rule 8 does provide insight into how 
the definition is addressed in many military manuals of states. For instance, many 
military manuals “state that the presence of civilians within or near military objectives 
does not render such objectives immune from attack.”
60
 Also, “numerous military 
manuals and official statements consider that an area of land can constitute a military 
objective if it fulfils the conditions contained in the definition.”
61
 However, it should be 
noted that there are differing interpretations of the definition of military objectives, 
centering primarily around the understanding of the phrases “effective contribution” and 
“military advantage”. For example, the United States interprets both phrases more 
broadly than other states and entities such as the International Committee of the Red 
                                                 
58
 Additional Protocol I, ibid at Article 52(2). 
59
 ICRC Study, supra note 49 at “Rule 8. Definition of Military Objectives”. 
60
 See ICRC Study, ibid at “Rule 8”. The list of state military manuals includes Australia, Canada, 
Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Germany, Hungary, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, 
Switzerland and the United States. 
61
 See ICRC Study, ibid  “Rule 8”. The list of state military manuals includes Australia, Belgium, Benin, 
Ecuador, France, Italy, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Togo, United Kingdom 
and the United States. Official statements are noted from the following states Belgium, Canada, Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Spain,  United Kingdom and the 
United States. 
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Cross [ICRC].
62
 Those states adopting a broad interpretation tend to consider the military 
advantage of an attack as a whole rather than on the basis of individual parts of the 
attack.
63
 This means that the advantage of individual parts of the attack may in fact be 
uncertain, so long as there is a definite overall advantage to the larger operation as a 
whole. Furthermore, the ICRC study found that military manuals of states, including the 
United States, Australia and Canada, do not find the presence of civilians in or near an 
objective as rendering the objective immune from attack, such as in the case of civilians 
working in a munitions factory.
64
 
            The definition of civilian object found in Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I 
does add somewhat to our understanding of how to distinguish military from civilian 
objects. While Article 52(1), defined above, merely provides that civilian objects are all 
objects which are not military objectives and are prohibited from being the subject of 
attack or reprisal
65
, article 52(3) provides an important addition: 
In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to 
civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other 
dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective 
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so 
used.
66
 
This paragraph creates an important presumption in favour of determining an object to be 
civilian. Such objects therefore must be protected from attack where there is doubt as to 
whether they are being used to make an effective contribution to military action. If a 
civilian object is used for a military purpose, it can become a legitimate target for military 
attack, but careful assessment must be made and all feasible precautions taken to avoid 
attacking a civilian object. 
                                                 
62
 For example, see discussion in Virgil Wiebe, “Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate 
Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law” (2000) 22 Mich J Int’l L 85 (HeinOnline) at 100-103. 
[hereinafter Wiebe] 
63
 ICRC Study, supra note 49 at  “Rule 8. Definition of Military Objectives”.  
64
 ICRC Study, ibid. 
65
 Additional Protocol I, supra note 4 at Article 52(1). 
66
 Additional Protocol I, ibid at Article 52(3). 
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            The ban on indiscriminate attacks is an established norm of customary IHL
67
 and 
is also codified in Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I 1977. Article 51(4) of Additional 
Protocol I defines indiscriminate attacks as follows:  
Indiscriminate attacks are: 
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military 
objective;    
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat 
which cannot be directed at a specific military 
objective; or   
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat 
the effects of which cannot be limited as required by 
this Protocol.
68
 
This means that belligerents must not be indiscriminate either in their target selection or 
in their choice of weapon. 
            In the ICRC Study on customary IHL indiscriminate attacks are covered under 
Rules 11 (prohibition of indiscriminate attacks) and 12 (definition of indiscriminate 
attacks).
69
 One key difference between the definition in Article 51(4) of Additional 
Protocol I (above) and Rule 12 of the ICRC study is that under 51(4)(c) it states “cannot 
be limited as required by this Protocol” whereas under customary IHL, it is effects which 
cannot be limited as required under international humanitarian law. This is an important 
distinction that increases protections beyond the scope of Additional Protocol I to include 
all conventional and customary rules of IHL, thereby incorporating not only protections 
included in Additional Protocol I but also the entire body of protections contained in 
customary IHL. This is particularly important because customary international law binds 
every state in the world automatically, whether they are party to a treaty codifying this 
                                                 
67
 ICRC study, supra note 49 at “Rule 11. Indiscriminate Attacks”. 
68
 Additional Protocol I, supra note 4 at Article 51(4). 
69
 ICRC Study, supra note 49 at “Rule 11. Indiscriminate Attacks” and “Rule 12. Definition of 
Indiscriminate Attacks”. 
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custom or not.
70
 Rule 71 of the ICRC Study on customary IHL expressly prohibits 
weapons that are by their very nature indiscriminate.
71
 This is important because it means 
that militaries may not employ weapons that cannot distinguish between civilians and 
combatants or between civilian objects and military objectives, although, deciding 
whether a particular weapon is prohibited due to indiscriminacy where there is no 
additional ban on the weapon itself remains uncertain.
72
 This risks ambiguity in practice 
if some states believe a weapon may be prohibited on grounds of indiscriminacy, while 
others feel a weapon is legal until otherwise prohibited by a specific weapons ban. 
2.2.4 Precaution and Proportionality 
            There remain two further important elements to the assessment of contemplated 
military actions: precaution and proportionality. Both conventional and customary IHL 
require military actors to take all feasible precautions to ensure that the objects of attack 
are military, and that the methods and means of attack are chosen to avoid, or at least 
minimize, the potential for injury or death to civilians and damage to civilian objects. 
These requirements for precaution are codified in Articles 57 and 58 of Additional 
Protocol I
73
 and articulated in the ICRC Study Rules 15-24.
74
 The requirement to “do 
everything feasible” and “take all feasible precautions” is a stringent one, but one 
necessary to ensure that military objectives do not unjustly take primacy over 
humanitarian concerns. 
            The principle of proportionality in armed conflict is a very important one, but it is 
also tricky because it introduces greater complexity and a degree of ambiguity to the 
                                                 
70
 See, for example, Cassese, supra note14 at 157. 
71
 ICRC Study, supra note 49 at “Rule 71 Weapons That Are by Nature Indiscriminate”. 
72
 ICRC Study, ibid “Rule 71”. 
73
 Additional Protocol I, supra note 4 at Article 57 and Article 58. 
74
 ICRC Study, supra note 49 at “Rule 15. Precautions in Attack”; “Rule 16. Target Verification”; “Rule 
17. Choice of Means and Methods of Warfare”; Rule 18. Assessment of the Effects of Attacks”; “Rule 19. 
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principle of distinction and the prohibition of attacks on civilians and civilian objects.  
The principle of proportionality foresees the likelihood of civilian injury and/or death as a 
result of a legal (by IHL standards) attack. Michael Schmitt defines it as the: 
[…] requirement to select the method or means of attack 
likely to cause the least collateral damage or incidental 
injury, all other things being equal, relative to the military 
advantage obtained.
75
 
The principle is codified in Articles 51(5)(b) and 57 of Additional Protocol I and 
reiterated as a principle of customary international law in Rule 14 of the ICRC Study.  
The principle of proportionality means that every time a civilian is killed or injured in 
armed conflict, or every time a civilian object is destroyed or damaged, this does not 
automatically mean a violation of IHL has occurred.
76
 One must examine each incident 
individually and evaluate whether the requirements of this principle, and the others 
already discussed, have been observed. Application of the principle of proportionality can 
be complicated. As Schmitt notes, “[p]roportionality calculations are heterogeneous, 
because dissimilar value genres – military and humanitarian – are being weighed against 
each other.”
77
 This complexity is appreciated and ongoing violations of IHL serve to 
demonstrate that something more is needed to help apply this principle. 
2.2.5 Military Necessity and Humanity 
            Military necessity and humanity are the twin pillars of IHL. No military action 
can be taken in conflicts without performing the delicate, or not so delicate as the case 
may be, dance of evaluation back and forth between these two values. As noted above, 
this is often a difficult task, as the two values do not often partner easily.
78
 Military 
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 Michael N Schmitt, “The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare” (1999) 2 Yale Hum Rts & 
Dev LJ 143 (HeinOnline) at 150. [hereinafter Schmitt (1999)] 
76
 Amnesty International, ‘Collateral Damage’ or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by 
NATO During Operation Allied Force (2000), online: Amnesty International 
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necessity justifies all military action in accordance with IHL, provided the principle of 
proportionality is respected, in order to defeat one’s opponent in an economical and 
efficient manner.
79
 Meanwhile, humanity prevents all military action which is 
unnecessary to defeating one’s opponent if the action is disproportionate to military 
gains.
80
 While it might seem straightforward to some, at least on paper, it is a very 
complicated determination involving numerous conflicting and seemingly unanswerable 
issues. “Force preservation is a crucial concern for the military” notes Amnesty 
International, “[b]ut can this consideration take precedent over legal obligations to protect 
civilians?”81 For Amnesty International it would seem the answer is a resounding, 
“No!”,
82
 but it is not so simple as that. One must remember that IHL, by incorporating 
the principles of military necessity, humanity, and proportionality, has necessarily 
introduced a certain amount of balancing, flexibility, and sometimes ambiguity, into 
armed conflict. 
            Bolstering the pillar of humanity in IHL is what is known as the Martens Clause. 
This Clause originates in the 1899 Hague Convention and reads as follows,  
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the high 
contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not 
included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and 
belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the 
principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, 
and the requirements of the public conscience.
83
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It recognizes the difficulty in addressing all potential situations that might arise in armed 
conflict in the provisions of a treaty, thereby providing protections in context not 
necessarily expressly covered by treaty. Since its original articulation in 1899, the Clause 
has been rearticulated in the Geneva Conventions, its Additional Protocols and many 
other IHL treaties.
84
  
         The Martens Clause was recognized as a rule of customary international law by the 
ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion.
85
 Judge Shahabuddeen, in his dissenting 
opinion from that case, discussed the Martens clause and concluded that, in the context of 
armed conflicts, “the Martens Clause provides authority for looking beyond treaty law 
and custom to consider principles of humanity and the dictates of the public 
conscience.”
86
 This position is supported by the International Law Commission [ILC], 
which has stated that the clause “provides that[,] even in cases not covered by specific 
international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and 
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience. "
87
 
         As important a rule as the Martens Clause is, Rupert Ticehurst notes that it is 
“subject to a variety of interpretations”.
88
 These interpretations range from more narrow 
interpretations which conceive of the Clause as a mere “reminder that customary 
international law continues to apply after the adoption of a treaty norm”, to the most 
expansive interpretations which see the Clause as mandating that “conduct in armed 
conflicts is not only judged according to treaties and custom but also to the principles of 
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international law referred to by the Clause.”
89
 Despite these varying interpretations, the 
existence of the Martens Clause provides strong support for the inclusion of the laws, or 
principles, of humanity in IHL. 
2.3 Environmental Protection in International Humanitarian 
Law 
            The environment is protected, to an extent, within IHL. There are two provisions 
codified in Additional Protocol I 1977 for its protection. Article 35(3) of that instrument 
states that “it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or 
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment.”
90
 Article 55 of the Protocol further states that: 
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural 
environment against widespread, long-term and severe 
damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of 
methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be 
expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and 
thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.  
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals 
are prohibited.
91
 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross, in its extensive and highly authoritative 
study of customary IHL, finds there are two rules on the environment established as 
customary IHL. Rule 44 in the study, on “Due Regard for the Natural Environment in 
Military Operations”, states: 
Methods and means of warfare must be employed with due 
regard to the protection and preservation of the natural 
environment. In the conduct of military operations, all feasible 
precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to 
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minimize, incidental damage to the environment. Lack of 
scientific certainty as to the effects on the environment of 
certain military operations does not absolve a party to the 
conflict from taking such precautions.
92
 
There are three important elements to the Rule articulated by the ICRC. First, the 
methods and means of warfare are limited for the protection and preservation of the 
natural environment. Weapons must be chosen with consideration to their potential 
effects on the environment. Second, all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid or 
minimize incidental damage to the environment when conducting military operations. 
This means that not only the selection of the weapon, but the method of the attack, and 
the actions taken in the attack, must all be considered through a lens which seeks to 
minimize potential damage to the environment. Finally, the final sentence of the Rule 
makes it clear that scientific uncertainty does not absolve military actors from the 
responsibility of taking all feasible precautions to protect the environment. This means 
that even where the risk of environmental damage is not scientifically certain, precautions 
to avoid potential environmental damage should be taken. 
            To support this rule of customary IHL, the ICRC refers, inter alia, to United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 687 in 1991, which addressed Iraq’s international 
legal responsibility for environmental damage caused in its invasion of Kuwait.
93
 This is 
important because it sanctions Iraq’s deliberate acts, of igniting oil pumps on fire, which 
caused serious environmental degradation in the region. Further, the ICRC references 
environmental law’s precautionary principle as an expression of the final element of rule 
44. It does this by invoking the key concepts of the precautionary principle: threat of 
serious damage to the environment, scientific uncertainty, and the need to take 
precautions despite this uncertainty. However, the reference to the precautionary 
principle in this context is limited to environmental protection and is not used to extend to 
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situations dealing with civilian health and safety.
94
 This is limiting because scientific 
uncertainty surrounding certain weapons often poses a threat to civilian health, and risks 
to the environment are closely linked to human health. While human health may still be 
protected indirectly by this reference, the failure to note the important link between health 
and the environment is part of a larger arbitrary separation of humanity and the natural 
environment. 
            The second rule protecting the environment in armed conflict, according to the 
ICRC’s study, is Rule 45 on “Causing Serious Damage to the Natural Environment”, 
which states: 
The use of methods or means of warfare that are intended, or 
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment is prohibited. Destruction of 
the natural environment may not be used as a weapon.
95
 
The ICRC cites numerous sources to show that significant state practice has emerged to 
support this rule. The ICRC found this prohibition in the military manuals of no less than 
20 states, including the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia.
96
 It also found 
national legislation which creates an offence for causing widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the environment in over 20 countries including Australia, Burundi, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom.
97
 Despite strong evidence of state practice, the ICRC 
also notes the existence of state practice that brings into question the status of this rule.  
In particular, some states have objected to the phrase “may be expected to cause” found 
in Article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I, and have claimed it is does not reflect 
customary international law.
98
 For example, the United Kingdom and United States have 
both suggested that Articles 35(3) and 55(1) of Additional Protocol I do not represent 
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customary law.
99
 On the other hand, Article 55 of Additional Protocol I “may … reflect 
current customary law”, according to the Final Report of the Committee Established to 
Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
100
 
Unfortunately, these objections and tentative assessments (the Report did not 
categorically endorse the customary status of the Article) do create a certain air of 
uncertainty when it comes to definitively saying whether or not the content of the ICRC’s 
Rule 45 is customary IHL. 
            The second part of Rule 45 is, however, more firmly established. That the 
destruction of the environment may not be used as a weapon is further codified in the 
1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques, more commonly referred to as ENMOD.
101
 The key difference 
between protections afforded in ENMOD and those found in Articles 35 and 55 of 
Additional Protocol I is that the former prohibits the deliberate use of technology to 
modify the environment, whereas the latter address effects of a method or means of 
attack.
102
 Nonetheless, it is not entirely clear whether and to what extent the provisions of 
ENMOD represent customary IHL.
103
 
            Apart from the treaty provisions and customary laws specifically targeting the 
protection of the environment in armed conflict based on an appreciation, for the most 
part, of its intrinsic value, a case can also be made that protections can be found on an 
anthropocentric level within the laws protecting civilian objects. As a civilian object, the 
protection of the environment will also be a consideration under the provisions protecting 
civilian objects, such as Article 48, requiring distinction between civilian objects and 
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military objectives, Article 51(4) which prohibits indiscriminate attacks, Article 57 which 
requires all feasible precautions be taken, and under Article 58 which requires 
proportionality in order to balance military necessity and the dictates of humanity. This 
means that threats to the environment can and should be considered in proportionality 
assessments of military operations. It is beneficial to the interests of environmental 
protection to embrace both the more ecocentric protections as well as this anthropocentric 
avenue as a civilian object. The more tools available for the protection of the 
environment, the greater the strength not simply of IHL or IEL, but public international 
law as a whole. The more weight behind demands that these laws be respected, and the 
more force behind condemnations when belligerents fail to adequately respect these laws, 
the greater the steps that are taken to better protect civilians and the environment. 
2.4 Civilian and Environmental Protections during Armed 
Conflicts in Practice: Theory vs. Practice 
            As can be seen in the discussion in the first part of this chapter, there are many 
protections for civilians and civilian objects in IHL. The second part of the chapter 
demonstrates that there are also some protections for the environment. Many, if not all, 
of, these key protections are enshrined in customary IHL and therefore apply to all actors 
in conflicts. Therefore, no state is immune to the obligations they create and the 
protections they provide for civilians and the environment. That said, the flexibility and 
ambiguity of IHL still allows attacks which cause a great deal of harm to civilians and the 
environment to occur. Let us turn briefly to two specific examples of more recent 
conflicts in which civilians and the environment appear to have suffered excessively. 
2.4.1 NATO bombings in Kosovo 
            In 2000, NATO faced allegations of violations of IHL for its military campaign in 
Kosovo. It drew criticism both for target selection and weapon choice, specifically the 
use of cluster munitions in proximity to civilian populations.
104
 One particular attack 
occurred in May 1999 on the village of Niš in Serbia. The NATO bombing occurred on a 
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Sunday, market day. The air convoy deployed cluster munitions, which landed on the 
village market and hospital. According to NATO officials, the real target was a nearby 
airport, but (speculated) technical malfunctions led to the release of the cluster munitions 
at the wrong time and therefore to civilian losses.
105
 As Virgil Wiebe points out, this 
choice of weapon was questionable, since there were civilian suburbs very near the 
airport.
106
 While there was no evidence that NATO deliberately targeted civilians, 
according to officials with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
[ICTY], who investigated this and other bombings carried out by NATO during the 
Kosovo campaign,
107
 the attack was nonetheless problematic with regard to a number of 
established rules of IHL, including the rule prohibiting indiscriminate attacks since the 
nature of cluster munitions is such that the dispersal of submunitions cannot be controlled 
and cannot distinguish between military and civilian objects or individuals..  
            Cluster bombs are bombs which contain a number of smaller explosive bomblets. 
When the larger bomb explodes, it disperses the smaller bomblets over a larger area than 
a single bomb could cover. As such, cluster bombs strike multiple points, as opposed to a 
traditional bomb or warhead, which strikes only one location. The dispersal of the 
bomblets is not, and cannot, be controlled. Typically, bomblet dispersal can cover a range 
of 350 to 500 meters.
108
 Upon impact, the bomblets are intended to explode, resulting in 
shrapnel dispersal which can cover an additional 150 meters.
109
 Even when they function 
as intended, cluster bombs pose a risk to civilians and civilian objects if used in their 
proximity because the dispersal of bomblets and of shrapnel is uncontrolled and does not 
distinguish between civilian and military targets. A further risk is posed by the number of 
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bomblets which fail to explode on initial impact and therefore become de facto 
landmines, posing ongoing risk to civilians and polluting the environment in which they 
lay. The predicted failure rate ranges from 2-6%; however, the actual failure rate in 
Kosovo was clearly higher, according to some reports, with estimates ranging from 8-
12% or even 20%.
110
 
            With these facts and figures about cluster munitions, it is difficult to see how any 
use of these munitions could meet the requirements in IHL for a legitimate attack. The 
use of cluster munitions near civilian populations fails to appreciate the short-term and 
long-term risks to civilians, civilian objects and the environment. 
2.4.2 Depleted Uranium Weapons in the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 
Iraq War 
            Both the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War saw the use of depleted uranium 
weapons by Coalition forces. Since uranium is a toxic metal,
111
 it inherently raises 
concerns with respect to the health risks it poses to civilians and combatants, as well as to 
potential short-term and long-term environmental risks. The impact and combustion of 
depleted uranium weapons can also create an aerosolized powder which can disperse and 
contaminate large areas, as well as be inhaled by people.
112
 One significant issue when 
dealing with depleted uranium weapons is the significant scientific uncertainty associated 
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with their long-term effects.
113
 This is exacerbated by the fact that it takes time to 
conduct the research to determine the effects over time. Among potential concerns from 
the use of depleted uranium weapons are kidney and lung damage, birth defects, and 
cancer.
114
 While the risks of depleted uranium weapons are not definitive, they are 
potentially severe and long-term. Arguably the health risks posed by these weapons are 
indiscriminate as they cannot be targeted solely at military targets and, even if they could 
be specifically targeted, a weapon which can cause cancer, birth defects and kidney and 
lung disease would seem to qualify as a weapon causing unnecessary suffering, 
particularly if the effects could arise and last long after a conflict has been decided.
115
 
            Decisions to use these weapons of unknown risk suggests a failure to adequately 
consider scientific uncertainty in the military decision-making process. Since so much 
uncertainty exists, it merits consideration that an alternative weapon or method perhaps 
be used while greater research is conducted to better understand the risks to civilians and 
environment from depleted uranium. 
2.4.3 Conclusion 
            There appears to be a disconnect between IHL protections for civilians, civilian 
objects, and the environment in theory and in practice. The codified protections seem 
extensive, while, in practice we see instant and lasting civilian casualties, damage and 
destruction to civilian objects, and short-term and long-term environmental damage. The 
two examples explored above suggest that existing IHL protections for civilians and the 
environment are not receiving their due regard in military decision-making or that there 
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are gaps in existing IHL which provide insufficient guidance on how it should be applied 
in practice. The cases discussed above have received some challenge from actors in the 
international community but these challenges have come to nothing and the voices have 
slowly died for the most part.
116
 These voices are important and should be listened to. 
The challenges to these weapons represent an increasing awareness of the need to better 
enforce protections for civilians and the environment in armed conflict. Meanwhile the 
actors behind these questionable attacks continue on under the banner of military 
necessity. States, such as the United States and the United Kingdom continue to support 
the use of depleted uranium weapons. Though the United Kingdom has ratified the 2008 
Cluster Munitions Convention, the United States, as mentioned above, is not party to this 
treaty and maintains the right to employ these weapons. The gap which provides leeway 
in favour of military actors allows states to continue using these weapons despite growing 
concern over the excessive risks they pose to civilians and the environment. The 
existence of this gap means that it is currently difficult to articulate a case against these 
actors as having violated IHL. This fact does not seem congruent with the objective of 
protections in place within conventional and customary IHL for civilians and the 
environment. What emerges from this analysis is an overlooked problem in IHL: the laws 
and protections for civilians and the environment, as formally articulated, do not seem to 
be fully realized in practice. 
2.5 Literature Review: Two Spheres Considered in Isolation 
            There has been much academic discussion and debate on the protection of 
civilians and the environmental in armed conflict.
117
 However, for the most part, this 
                                                 
116
 These challenges, in the context of cluster munitions use in Kosovo, were raised by NGOs, including 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, scholars, and the Russian Parliament. Their attempts 
were unsuccessful in trying to get the ICTY to investigate NATO bombings in Kosovo. See e.g. Wiebe, 
supra note 62 at 134. In the context of depleted uranium weapons concerns have been raised by numerous 
NGOs, including Human Rights Watch, the Campaign to Ban Depleted Uranium, scholars and states, such 
as Belgium and Costa Rica who have domestic bans on the weapons. See e.g. International Coalition to 
Ban Uranium Weapons, “CADU challenges flawed UK legal review of depleted uranium munitions” (13 
July 2012) available at: http://www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/cadu-challenges-flawed-uk-legal-review-
of-du-munit. 
117
 E.g., Karen Hulme, “Environmental protection in armed conflict” in Fitzmaurice, Malgosia, David M 
Ong and Panos Merkouris, eds, Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Cheltenham, 
35 
 
academic critique has remained within the scope of either IHL or environmental law and 
rarely are the two bodies of law examined in tandem. Further, the focus often tends to be 
on either the protection of civilians in armed conflict or the protection of the 
environment, which fails to appreciate the inextricable link between people and the 
environment. 
            There is ample material exploring the issue of civilian protection in armed 
conflict. For example, Gary Solis, a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the U.S. Marines, 
retired Professor of Law at the U.S. Military Academy and former Director of West 
Point’s Law of War Program, is well situated to provide a thorough and detailed 
examination of the IHL. In his book, The Law of Armed Conflict,
118
 he examines the 
difficulties of defining a legal objective, interprets legal definitions of ‘military 
objective’, evaluates the legitimacy of potential targets based on use, examines the 
process of making targeting decisions, and looks at the law surrounding indiscriminate 
attacks.
119
 These are important areas to examine as they are often points of ambiguity or 
disagreement within the field. For example, given the differing interpretations of military 
objective noted above, this can affect whether something is seen as legitimate or 
illegitimate target for military action. Other scholars, such as Jose-Thota Betcy, also 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010) 586 [hereinafter Hulme, “Environmental protection”]; Solis, supra 
note 83; Hans-Peter Gasser, “For Better Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict: A 
Proposal for Action” (1995) 89 AJIL 637 [hereinafter Gassser]; Laurent R Hourcle, “Environmental Law of 
War” (2000-2001) 25 Vt L Rev 653 [hereinafter Hourcle]; Amnesty International. “Collateral Damage”, 
supra note 76; Michael N Schmitt, “Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental Law of International 
Armed Conflict” (1997) 22 Yale J Int’l L 1 [hereinafter Schmitt (1997)]; Betcy, Jose-Thota. “The fog of 
protection: Contested meanings and deliberate civilian deaths during armed conflict” (PhD Dissertation; 
University of Pittsburgh, 2011) [Accessible on ProQuest] [hereinafter Betcy]; Bothe, Michael Carl Bruch, 
Jordan Diamond, and David Jensen. “International law protecting the environment during armed conflict: 
gaps and opportunities” (2010) 92: 879 Intl R Red Cross 569 [hereinafter Bothe et al.]; Lesley Wexler, 
“Limiting the Precautionary Principle: Weapons Regulation in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty” (2005) 
UC Davis L Rev 459 (Hein Online)[hereinafter Wexler]. 
118
 Note: the term Law of Armed Conflict [LOAC] used by the military and given the military perspective 
from which Solis book is written it uses this term as opposed to IHL. This thesis will stick with the term 
IHL. 
119
 Solis, supra note 83 at 519-555. 
36 
 
examine the ambiguities in the definition of ‘military objective’.
120
 Betcy examines 
violations of the civilian immunity norm and seeks to understand their occurrence. 
Whereas Solis identifies potential issues in the law, Betcy seeks to identify the source of 
violations in practice, though his focus remains staunchly on civilians and armed 
conflict.
121
 Betcy conducted interviews with experts in IHL and with belligerents in 
African conflicts to conclude that the continuing occurrence of violations of civilian 
immunity are the result of a disconnect between the interpretation of legal protections for 
civilians in the minds of IHL experts and the interpretation of the same in the minds of 
belligerents.
122
 While Betcy identifies this as a potential explanation for continuing 
violations, he unfortunately does not propose any solutions to resolve the discrepancy in 
interpretation. 
            Michael Schmitt, in his article, “The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century 
Warfare,”
123
 also gives an in-depth examination of the requirement to distinguish 
between civilian and military. Beginning with an analysis of the current state of the 
principle, Schmitt then proceeds to examine the effects growing economic and 
technological disparity, religious and ethnic discord, the increasingly blurred lines 
between military and civilian, and the development of information acquisition and 
dissemination.
124
 On the whole, Schmitt determines these trends pose a threat to the 
principle of discrimination as they tend to increase the desire, and ability perhaps, to 
broaden the definition of valid targets and decrease the incentive to protect the 
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humanitarian aspects of the law.
125
 In an effort to avoid or limit the negative direction in 
which Schmitt predicts these trends are leading, Schmitt advocates in favour of 
strengthening the role of international organizations and coalitions of States in enforcing 
humanitarian standards, arms control and an overall limiting of the universe of legal 
targets.
126
 Schmitt’s conclusion that limiting the universe of legal targets would help 
protect the principle and the humanitarian aspects of the law of armed conflict is very 
persuasive. Unfortunately, he does not propose any specific means by which to limit the 
universe of legal targets. 
            The trend in these articles is an examination of IHL from a very positivist 
perspective. This is also the case in an article by Nobuo Hayashi, “Requirements of 
Military Necessity in International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal 
Law”.
127
 This article provides a thoroughly positivist examination of military necessity in 
IHL and international criminal law. It isolates the role of military necessity as an 
exception to certain specific rules of IHL prohibiting certain actions when those actions 
are required to attain a military objective. While the work of Betcy and Schmitt tends to 
focus on the civilian costs of violations of the discrimination principle, Hayashi focuses 
on the destruction of civilian property. While there is potential to consider the 
environment as a civilian object, as discussed by Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise 
Doswald-Beck in the ICRC’s study on customary IHL,
128
 Hayashi does not address the 
potential consideration of the environment, instead focusing on tangible property such as 
buildings, vehicles, etc. 
            While the above articles provide a traditional and very useful analysis of law, they 
fail to appreciate the many other powerful sources and tools of law. There is a tendency 
towards overemphasizing conventional laws while underappreciating customary law, 
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norms, and principles. This is why Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck’s 
Customary Humanitarian Law Vol I: Rules, done for the ICRC, is such an important 
resource when examining IHL. Customary IHL is a valid source of international law just 
as conventions are, as demonstrated by Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, which lists the 
most authoritative sources of public international law.
129
 The ICRC’s study is the most 
thorough and extensive study of state practice and opinio juris conducted by a well-
established and well-respected body, and only the holding of the ICJ that something is a 
customary law of war would be more authoritative and conclusive.   
            As can be seen, there is a strong body of academic literature addressing the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict, though quite often suggestions on how to 
improve these protections are weak or lacking. Meanwhile, there is also a body of 
literature which addresses the protection of the environment in armed conflict.  In his 
PhD dissertation, “Legal perspectives for the protection of the environment against the 
effects of military activities during international armed conflict,” Mansour Jabbari-
Gharabagh examines the protection of the environment in armed conflict.
130
 He explores 
criticisms of existing IHL laws for the protection of the environment and proposes ways 
to modify them in order to provide more effective environmental protection during 
conflicts.
131
 While he examines both IHL and environmental law, his analysis of these 
bodies of law is separate and does not really attempt to join them as a means of 
improving environmental protection in armed conflict. Meanwhile, his analysis of 
environmental law is limited and relies primarily on conventions,
132
 failing to examine 
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the many important principles such as the precautionary principle, which could help 
create a legal understanding of environmental protection in armed conflicts. Importantly, 
Jabbari-Gharabagh looks at the environment from an ecocentric perspective, evaluating 
the importance of protection based on the intrinsic value of the environment as opposed 
to a more anthropocentric valuation.
133
 Ultimately, Jabbari-Gharabagh advocates creating 
an international war crime for “crimes against nature”.
134
 While this is a novel and 
interesting approach to improving protections, he fails to analyze the feasibility of using 
this approach, which would require state consensus to create a new international crime. 
            Karen Hulme, in her piece, “A Darker Shade of Green: Is it Time to Ecocentrise 
the Laws of War?,” also focus on the importance of a more ecocentric approach to 
environmental protections in armed conflicts.
135
 While explaining ecocentrism and 
ecosystems, she relies on environmental law, but when she shifts to discussing 
environmental protection in conflicts she abandons environmental law and relies almost 
entirely on existing IHL.
136
 While her suggestion of increasing protections for the 
environment for its intrinsic value is an important one with much potential,
137
 she makes 
the same error many other scholars do by failing to draw upon environmental law as a 
solution or aid to improving these protections in IHL. 
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            The environmental problems posed by armed conflict are examined by Onitas Das 
in her article, “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Sustainable Development,”
138
 which 
provides a good discussion of the environmental impacts of war before, during, and after 
conflicts.
139
 While her suggestion of the need for more ‘sustainable development 
friendly’ war
140
 is of great merit, she does not go into great detail on how to achieve this, 
but it certainly an idea worth exploring further. This suggestion is worthy of further 
exploration since sustainable development provides an important link between the 
environment and conflict (one that will be discussed later in this thesis) as well as helping 
to encompass the importance of ensuring long-term interests, both human and 
environmental, are considered in conflict. 
            With Das’ piece we do see efforts to bridge the gap between the bodies of IHL 
and environmental law. This bridging of these two fields of law is also seen in 
“International law protecting the environment during armed conflict: gaps and 
opportunities,” an article for the ICRC by Michael Bothe, Carl Bruch, Jordan Diamond, 
and David Jensen.
141
 Bothe et al. identify three key deficiencies with regards to existing 
environmental protections in IHL: the definition of damage to the environment is both 
too restrictive and too unclear; the protection of elements of the environment as civilian 
objects is rife with legal uncertainties; and, the application of the principle of 
proportionality is problematic in cases where harm to the environment constitutes 
‘collateral damage’.
142
 Having identified these deficiencies, the authors go on to discuss 
the possibilities of applying international environmental law in armed conflicts with a 
specific look at customary law and soft law.
143
 Their focus, however, is the potential 
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incorporation of principles of environmental law to improve the protection of the 
environment, once again failing to appreciate the connection between the environment 
and civilian protection. While they are insightful in their approach, which seeks to bridge 
the gap between IHL and environmental law in armed conflicts, their conception is 
incomplete for its failure to include the risks to civilians that could also benefit from 
closing the gap between these bodies of law. 
            An approach to IHL and environmental law which more closely links to two 
bodies of law can be seen in Lesley Wexler’s article, “Limiting the Precautionary 
Principle: Weapons Regulation in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty,” in which she 
examines the potential use of the environmental law precautionary principle in a military 
context, referring to it as the military precautionary principle.
144
 While she provides an 
example of applying a principle of environmental law in the military context, she restricts 
her scope to focus on employing it solely on weapons as a weapon-by-weapon evaluation 
to determine away from the battlefield at the weapon production stage whether a weapon 
is or should be legal.
145
 Ultimately, Wexler concludes that the use of the military 
precautionary principle may lead to perverse environmental prioritization in the military 
context. For example, she suggests it will disadvantage new technologies and fail to 
consider that alternatives may in fact pose greater risks that the weapon under 
consideration.
146
 In particular she compares tungsten rounds as an alternative to depleted 
uranium weapons and suggests they pose many of the same risks.
147
 She is concerned 
that rejecting a particular weapon based on the precautionary principle fails to consider 
that the alternatives may in fact be worse,
148
 but she fails to explain why these 
alternatives themselves would not be subject to the same principled evaluations. Wexler 
does not delve into detail about the specific environmental or health problems involved.  
                                                 
144
 Wexler, supra note 117. 
145
 Wexler, ibid at 461, 475-477, 503-504. 
146
 Wexler, ibid at 499-500, 510-511. 
147
 Wexler, ibid at 499-500. 
148
 Wexler, ibid. 
42 
 
While her approach to considering principles of environmental law in the context of 
military operations is particularly interesting because it is an approach that many other 
scholars have not yet embraced, her limited approach seems too narrow and fails to 
appreciate the fact that often a weapon system may be problematic in certain contexts and 
not in other and, therefore, to evaluate a weapon outside of a particular context is 
unrealistic. 
2.6 Conclusion 
            This chapter has examined the current status of protections for civilians and the 
environment in armed conflicts. It has outlined the well-established principles of 
distinction between civilian and military, the avoidance of unnecessary suffering, the 
limitation on the permissible means of warfare, precaution and proportionality. While 
these provisions and customs protect civilians, they also protect the environment 
indirectly as a civilian object. The environment is also protected directly under 
international humanitarian law. Despite extensive protections which require that the 
dictates of humanity receive proper consideration alongside military necessity, there 
appears to be a gap in international humanitarian law which allows states to carry out 
attacks which appear to be excessively damaging to civilians and the environment. Two 
such examples were outlined in this chapter: the use of cluster munitions in NATO 
bombings in Kosovo and the use of depleted uranium weapons by Coalition forces in 
Iraq. 
            This chapter also provided a literature review which demonstrates that there is 
strong research on the plight of civilians in armed conflict as well as the risks to the 
environment, but they are rarely considered in tandem. This is a curious gap in the 
academic literature. The environment is a constant through all times, space, geographic 
and conflict contexts. Whether there is human life in the vicinity or not, the environment 
is nonetheless present. Therefore, when civilians are present, inevitably and inextricably 
both human and natural environments comingle. People depend on a healthy environment 
to ensure their own health, to provide space to live, conduct business, grow food, provide 
water and other essentials of life. Given the interdependence of humans and the 
environment, a risk posed to one will pose a risk to the other. While the potential to 
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improve the application of existing IHL by bridging the gap between IHL and 
environmental law is hinted at in some of the works discussed above, there is greater 
scope for this potential than has been addressed in existing academic literature. As Bothe 
et al. note,  
the detailed norms, standards, approaches, and mechanisms found 
in international environmental law might also help to clarify and 
extend basic principles of IHL to prevent, address, or assess 
liability for environmental damage incurred during armed 
conflict.
149
 
This should be extended to include preventing and addressing violations of civilian 
immunity, drawing on environmental law to address violations of the protections 
provided for civilians and the environment in armed conflicts because the issues are so 
interconnected. Environmental law is also an area of law that considers not only harms to 
the natural environment, but also harms to the human environment. It is an area of law 
that, due to the natural evolution of scientific knowledge, is familiar with considering 
scientific uncertainty in decision-making processes. Environmental law is also an 
appropriate area of law from which to draw as it is accustomed to addressing not only 
immediate harms but also long-term harms. It therefore provides a means of considering 
a broader and more accurate temporal span for the harms that must be considered, such as 
civilian health and environmental and ecological consequences. 
            This thesis attempts to close the gap between IHL and environmental law through 
the use of principles of environmental law as a means to narrow the opportunity in 
military assessment of justifying actions which threaten civilian immunity and 
environmental protections under the banner of military necessity or by excusing them 
based on scientific uncertainty. The use of indiscriminate weapons with high failure rates, 
or associated with great scientific uncertainty, and significant potential for long-term 
lasting harm to both human and natural environments is not being adequately considered 
in weapon and target selection. If current IHL provides inadequate protections, perhaps 
what is required is a new approach which better addresses risks to health and the 
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environment, which encompasses approaches to scientific uncertainty, and includes both 
short-term and long-term appraisals of risks and consequences. This thesis suggests that 
principles of environmental law are the tool that will aid the application of existing IHL 
by clarifying decision-making and limiting the space in which military necessity and/or 
scientific uncertainty can be relied on to justify actions which violate protections for 
civilians and the environment. 
             The next chapter will now turn to the sources of international law. In particular, it 
will provide an in-depth examination of general principles of international law: their 
identification, functions, and importance in international law. It will demonstrate the 
important role general principles can play and establish how principles of environment 
law can be of use in other areas of law, not simply international environmental law.  
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Chapter 3  
3 The Power of Principles: General Principles of 
International Law 
3.1 Introduction 
            While Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice [ICJ]
150
 
provides the sources of international law upon which the ICJ can rely to resolve cases 
before it, the sources listed in this Article are also relied upon much more broadly as 
demonstrative of international law. Article 38(1)(a) list conventions, or treaties, as 
sources of international law, while Article 38(1)(b) refers to customary law, arising out of 
general practice and opinio juris. Article 38(1)(c) cites the general principles of law as 
recognized by civilized nations as sources of international law. Meanwhile, Article 
38(1)(d) refers to subsidiary sources which can be relied upon, specifically “judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations”.
151
 The focus of this chapter is not the first two oft-discussed and widely 
understood sources of convention and custom, nor the subsidiary sources of judicial 
decisions and academic writing. Rather, the focus of this chapter is on general principles 
of law. 
            Article 38(1)(c) lists “the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations” as a source of international law. The inclusion of general principles here is not 
only distinct from conventional and customary law but it is also, importantly, distinct 
from the subsidiary sources referred to in 38(1)(d). However, as will be discussed later in 
this chapter, this separation from the specifically referenced “subsidiary” sources has not 
necessarily resolved the question of where general principles fall in the hierarchy of 
sources of international law, assuming there is a hierarchy at all. 
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            This chapter will take a closer look at this source of international law, beginning 
first with an attempt to define “principles” or at least examine the different ways in which 
the term has been used and defined. Three sources of general principles are discussed: 
national legal systems, the law itself, and the international legal system. Christopher 
Ford’s comparativist and categoricist approaches to identifying general principles are also 
examined. Next, I will examine the different functions general principles have been put to 
in international law both in judicial decisions and in academic work. I categorize these 
functions into four categories: (1) a unification function; (2) a gap-filling function; (3) an 
interpretive function; and, (4) a development function. Each of these functions is 
examined in turn. The relationship between custom and general principles will be 
explored as well as the question of hierarchy of sources of international law. Finally, the 
argument that principles are soft law, or non-binding, is explored. 
            It must be noted at the outset that the term ‘principle’ is used in a multitude of 
contexts by international legal commentators. At times they are indeed referring to 
general principles of international law, the source recognized by Article 38(1)(c) of the 
ICJ Statute. Other times, they may be referring to principles which are either not general 
or not law. This chapter focuses on the former, general principles of international law as a 
source of international law emanating from Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute.  
3.2 Defining Principles of International Law 
            There is no one source which clearly and completely defines what is meant by the 
phrase “general principles of law”.
152
 In fact, how to define and identify such principles 
has long been a matter of practical and academic disagreement and debate.
153
 For 
example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s [ICTY’s] 
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decision in Kupreskic,
154
 refers to general principles in three different ways within one 
paragraph: “general principles of international criminal law”, “general principles of 
criminal law common to the major legal systems of the world”, and “general principles of 
law consonant with the basic requirements of international justice.”
155
 As Gideon Boas 
notes, “the reference to the three forms of general principles does not facilitate any 
comprehension of their meaning or relationship with the ‘general principles of law’ as it 
is enshrined as a source of international law in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.”
156
 The 
International Court of Justice [ICJ] has also been vague, or avoided altogether, defining 
“principles” or providing insight in how to identify them.
157
 Even where scholars attempt 
to define “general principles”, their definitions are, as Cherif Bassiouni notes, “so general 
and self-evident that they add little to the plain meaning of the very words they intend to 
define.”
158
 These include expressions such as “cardinal principles of the legal system”, 
“core of legal ideas which are common to all civilized legal systems”, and “manifestation 
of the universal legal conscience certified by the law of civilized States.”
159
 Despite this 
lack of agreement and clarity on general principles, there are, nonetheless, key elements 
and important concepts that can be drawn from the abundance of discourse in existence 
on the subject. 
3.3 Toward a Basic Definition of General Principles 
            Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute refers to “the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations”.
160
 The term “civilized” is more or less ignored in 
modern considerations of the source, a no longer acceptable relic of past colonial 
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mindsets.
161
 Instead, it is more often thought of as “general principles of law recognized 
by the community of nations”.
162
 Still, the language gives little indication as to where or 
how these principles should be defined or identified. Scholars, such as the late Oscar 
Schachter, provide some basic characteristics of general principles.
163
 Rather than 
provide a single definition of general principles, he contrasts the “generality and 
abstractness” of principles to the “definiteness” of legal rules.
164
 He states that principles 
“have a wide range of application” and that they naturally give way, when more than one 
principle applies to a situation, to a weighing and balancing to find the specific 
solution.
165
 According to Raz, “[p]rinciples, because they prescribe highly unspecified 
acts, tend to be more vague and less certain than rules.”
166
 This is, in fact, a benefit of 
principles because it allows for a broader range of application and to “leave room for 
varying interpretation”.
167
 This generality of principles of international law allows room 
to be adapted for more specific contexts in different situations and different areas of law, 
as well as to develop more specific content in domestic legal systems. 
            Next, is how to recognize a general principle and how much recognition from 
states is required for their existence. Once again, we encounter a certain amount of 
ambiguity because, as Bassiouni notes, “no quantitative or numerical test for States 
having such a ‘principle’ has ever been established.”
168
 What is clear is that, while it 
must exist in multiple states, it “does not have to meet the test of ‘universal 
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acceptance’”.
169
 The “universal acceptance” requirement or test has been rejected by the 
ICJ in both the South West Africa Cases
170
 and the North Sea Continental Shelf case.
171
 
This rejection was articulated most clearly in the dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka in 
the South West Africa Cases when he states, “[t]he recognition of a principle by civilized 
nations … does not mean recognition by all civilized nations”.
172
 
            For Schachter, these principles are ones “intrinsic to the idea of law”, required by 
“the nature of human beings”, or necessitated by the structure of international society.”
173
 
Bassiouni suggests that general principles are “expressions of other unperfected sources 
of international law enumerated in the statutes of the PCIJ [Permanent Court of 
International Justice, the predecessor to the ICJ] and ICJ; namely, conventions, customs, 
writings of scholars, and decisions of the PCIJ and ICJ.”
174
 For Bassiouni, these 
unperfected sources, for instance, “when a custom is not evidenced by sufficient or 
consistent practice, or when States express opinio juris without any supportive practice” 
can “singularly or cumulatively with others, may possibly be considered to be 
expressions of a given principle. “
175
 
            This close link between general principles and other sources of international law, 
such as treaty and custom, can also be seen in the treatment of general principles by the 
ICJ. At times, the ICJ has dealt with general principles in a manner in which the line 
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between principle and custom is not easily distinguished.
176
 For example, in the ICJ’s 
judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, the court stated “certain basic legal 
notions which […] have from the beginning reflected the opinio juris in the matter of 
delimitation; those principles being that delimitation must be the object of agreement 
between the States concerned, and that such agreement must be arrived at in accordance 
with equitable principles.”
177
 Here, the ICJ both links equity to opinio juris, suggesting it 
has the nature of custom, while also referring to ‘equitable principles’. Meanwhile, in 
other cases, the ICJ more clearly separates custom from principles. This can be seen in 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, where this time on the subject of equity the ICJ 
explicitly stated that “legal concept of equity is a general principle directly applicable as 
law”.
178
 Bassiouni notes that “some principles that are not encompassed in customary 
law may be implicated by the term "General Principles."
179
 This suggests that while 
sometimes a general principle will also be customary law, at other times a general 
principle will merely be a general principle and not also customary. Boas suggests two 
possible solutions to this quandary: that such principles are located or recognized by the 
national legal systems of states; or, that, quite separate from domestic legal systems, they 
are “derived directly from international legal relations and legal relations generally.”
180
 
In fact there are several different proposed ways of identifying general principles and 
these are examined more closely below. 
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3.3.1 Derived from National Laws 
            One of the most commonly discussed interpretations of general principles posits 
that they originate from the domestic law of states. Sean Murphy states that it “can mean 
principles that exist in the national laws of states worldwide.”181 However, he goes on to 
note that the language found in Article 38(1)(c) – general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations – “does not actually refer to national law.”182 Boas claims there are two 
sources for general principles, only one of which is principles “recognized by the 
domestic legal systems of the world.”183 The other is that “[g]eneral principles may be 
derived from international legal relations and legal relations generally.”
184
 Bassiouni also 
sees two avenues for identifying general principles, only the first of which is “expressions 
of national legal systems”.185 The other is that they are “expressions of other unperfected 
sources of international law enumerated in the statutes of the PCIJ and ICJ; namely, 
conventions, customs, writings of scholars, and decisions of the PCIJ and ICJ.”
186
 
            These scholars are not alone in their belief that national legal systems are a source 
of general principles. Bassiouni cites to many other scholars who identify general 
principles as coming from domestic legal systems. General principles are, according to 
Verzijl, “fundamental to every well-ordered society”187, while Favre, as cited by 
Lammers, defines them as “norms underlying national legal orders”188. Ultimately, 
Bassiouni asserts that there seems to be at least some consensus among scholars that 
principles “are found in the underlying or posited principles or postulates of national 
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legal systems”, but, critically, this sentence does not end there. It is followed by the 
words “or of international law.”
189
 
            This addition by Bassiouni recognizes the problem of solely identifying general 
principles from national legal systems, also recognized by Murphy and Ford. Ford raises 
the problem of unsuitability. It is not always suitable to adopt principles from a particular 
legal context into another, let alone from domestic law to international law and vice-
versa.
190
 In fact, Ford suggests that “[d]irect translation between domestic and 
international jurisprudence may well do violence to the real values and policies served by 
principles ostensibly accepted at both levels.”
191
 It is not so much that general principles 
can never, or should never, be found in domestic legal systems, but rather that “they 
should not reflexively be borrowed ‘after a census of domestic systems.’”
192
 Ultimately, 
the key is, as Murphy notes, the language of Article 38(1)(c), which requires recognition 
of the principles by nations, not that the source of the principles be the domestic laws of 
the nations themselves.
193
 
3.3.2 Intrinsic to the Idea of Law 
            Another potential interpretation of general principles sees them as “principles 
intrinsic to the idea of law.”
194
 That is, these principles are inherent to the very 
conceptions of justice or fairness.
195
 An example of this can be seen in the PCIJ’s 
judgment in the River Meuse case, wherein the court justified its application of the 
principles of equity under general principles of law.
196
 Such a use of the term ‘general 
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principles’ can also be seen in the ICTY’s judgment of the Kupreskic case, in which the 
Tribunal refers to “general principles of law consonant with the basic requirements of 
international justice.”
197
 As noted earlier, the tribunal used the term ‘general principles’ 
in two additional ways, which indicates that, while principles may be found in the very 
idea of law itself, they may also be drawn from other sources.  
            Nonetheless, there is further support for sourcing (at least some) general 
principles in the basic nature of law itself. Frances Jalet’s definition of general principles 
sees them as “principles that constitute that unformulated reservoir of basic legal 
concepts universal in application, which exist independently of the institutions of any 
particular country and form the irreducible essence of all legal systems.”
198
 Her 
definition is interesting in that, while it embraces general principles as being intrinsic to 
law by reference to the “irreducible essence of all legal systems”, it also seems to reject 
the proposition discussed above, which states that general principles are to be found 
inside domestic law. 
3.3.3 Derived from the International Legal System 
            Finally, an interpretation of general principles suggests that they are derived from 
international law itself. As Boas states, they “may be derived directly from international 
legal relations and legal relations generally.”
199
  By this, Boas is referring to the many 
interpretive principles employed by international courts, such as lex specialis derogate 
legi generali (special laws prevail over general laws). He is also referring to 
“[f]oundational principles of the international community – such as the sovereign 
equality of states”.
200
 This understanding of general principles can also be seen in the 
Kupreskic case as the ICTY refers to “general principles of international criminal 
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law”.
201
 It is also inherent in Bassiouni’s definition of general principles as “expressions 
of other unperfected sources of international law”.
202
 This approach is also evidenced by 
the fact that international courts have drawn upon “State conduct, policies, practices, and 
pronouncements at the international level, which may be different from domestic legal 
principles” to identify general principles of law.
203
 This understanding of general 
principles also emphasizes the usefulness of principles in the articulation of norms by 
courts and the “values of the ‘legal community’”.
204
 As Ford elaborates, it is general 
principles that allow courts to “[articulate] hitherto unexpressed international legal 
norms”.
205
 
3.4 Comparativist or Categoricist Approaches to Identifying 
General Principles 
            Christopher Ford describes two different approaches for the identification of 
general principles: the comparativist approach and the categoricist approach. He 
describes the comparativist approach as being essentially “an international jurist’s 
invitation to undertake a colossal comparative-law project.”
206
 Under this approach, for 
something to be a general principle, it would need to be “recognized in substance by all 
the main systems of law”.
207
 This approach is very much in line with the approach which 
sees principles as being derived from national legal systems. This approach sees general 
principles identified after a thorough survey of the domestic legal systems and finding the 
same principle expressed in many different legal systems.
208
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            On the other hand, under the categoricist approach, principles are “seen to be 
‘general’ by virtue of being inherent to the very idea of law.”
209
 The “real test [is] not 
universal domestic consensus but a sort of transcendental propriety.”
210
 What general 
principles truly are, by categoricist standards, are “general propositions underlying the 
various rules of law which express the essential qualities of juridical truth itself”.
211
 
            It is plain to see that the comparativist and categoricist approaches differ 
considerably in their understanding of general principles and neither approach is ideal.  
As Ford observes, the comparativist approach is very cumbersome with its requirement 
of an extensive examination of all domestic legal systems.
212
 At the same time, the 
categoricist approach can be criticized for “[placing] itself solely at the mercy of the 
decision maker.”
213
 Ford advocates instead for a balancing of the two approaches. This 
comparative-categorical approach would still allow for “judicial discretion in interpreting 
values and applying norms”,
214
 but might also employ “comparative methods to evaluate 
the genuine character of candidate principles and to act as something of a ‘reality check’ 
on the exercise of judicial discretion.”
215
 Nonetheless, Ford warns against strict adoption 
of domestic principles directly into international legal contexts.
216
 Ultimately, Ford 
concludes that “[w]hile general principles doctrine forswears rigid reliance upon 
comparative study for the derivation of general principles, its retention of comparativist 
guideposts may be an important tool”.
217
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            Article 38(1)(c) definitively indicates that general principles are indeed a source 
of international law. Unfortunately, it does not provide a clear answer as to how to define 
or identify these principles. Perhaps this is not so problematic when the inherent general 
and abstract nature of these principles is considered, along with their functions in 
international law. The fact is, international courts draw principles from all three of the 
above discussed areas: national law, the idea of law itself, and international law. 
Oftentimes, a principle can be found in more than one or even all of these different areas. 
This flexibility is reflective of the inherent flexibility of the principles themselves. 
3.5 The Role of General Principles in International Law 
            Just as there are many means of identifying general principles, there are also 
many methods of categorizing the functions that they serve in international law. For the 
purpose of this thesis, it will be proposed that general principles perform four key 
functions: 
(1) A unification function: general principles act as a counterforce against the 
fragmentation of international law; 
(2) A gap-filling function: where lacunae arise in international law, general 
principles can act to fill the gap; 
(3) An interpretive function: general principles aid in the interpretation of 
international law; and 
(4) A development function: general principles aid in the development of 
international law.
218
 
 Like the different origins of general principles, often a principle can perform a different 
function depending on the context, or can perform multiple functions at the same time.  
These four functions are examined in greater detail below. 
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3.5.1 Unification Function 
            While critics of international law often lament its decentralized nature with no one 
central authority to control all, this is not quite the same issue that is meant when 
discussing the increasing fragmentation of the international legal system. Fragmentation, 
in this context, as defined by the International Law Commission [ILC] in its study on the 
matter, is “the splitting up of the law into highly specialized ‘boxes’ that claim relative 
autonomy from each other and from the general law.”
219
 Fragmentation is the result of 
the creation of “such specialist systems as ‘trade law’, ‘human rights law’, 
‘environmental law’ […] – each possessing their own principles and institutions.”
220
 
Prost describes it as a process of expansion, densification and diversification to a point at 
which “frames and margins are blurred, where legal spaces overlap and conflict with each 
other, [and] a network with a plurality of voices, lacking a master plan or blueprint” is 
created.
221
 
            Splitting up areas of specialization is common practice in domestic systems. In 
Canada, the United States, Great Britain and many other countries, there exist individual 
ministries dealing with trade, the environment, justice, and so on with a central 
government or governments to oversee the overall process. However, in the international 
legal system, “the conceptual-doctrinal consistency, the clear hierarchy of norms and the 
effective judicial hierarchy that was developed within the nation-states, is lacking.”
222
 
The big concern fragmentation presents is the “danger of conflicting and incompatible 
rules, principles, rule-systems and institutional practices.”
223
 And the critical question it 
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raises, as the ILC describes in its study, is “[h]ow should the relationship between such 
[specialized] ‘boxes’ be conceived?”
224
 To understand how general principles can help 
address the concerns of fragmentation, it is useful to turn to the late Oscar Schachter’s 
analogy of the international legal system to a system of towns, villages, paths and 
highways, as well as to look at the additional functions of general principles which are 
also important for fulfilling the unification function.
225
 
            Schachter’s analogy compares international law to a large terrain. On this terrain, 
or map, a specialized branch of law is represented by a village or town, wherein they 
focus on their own affairs. There are narrow paths that run between these towns and 
villages, but they are used infrequently. Instead, covering the entire map are 
“superhighways, the connecting links, which in the metaphor convey the general 
principles and concepts.”
226
 Schachter then proceeds to elaborate on how the actors on 
this map relate to the different elements of the terrain. He says: 
Those who travel on the highways are generally only dimly aware 
of the lively activities in the towns and villages. Those who 
remain only in the local communities immersed in their 
specialties tend to lose sight of the interconnections and 
coherence of the larger whole.
227
  
Schachter goes on to emphasize the importance of the superhighways, of general 
principles and concepts, because international law “is much more than a congery of 
separate legal régimes in particular fields. Just as facts become meaningful when they are 
linked to ideas and norms, so do ideas and norms gather strength as they become part of a 
coherent interrelated system.”
228
 For Schacter, it is these general principles and concepts 
that give the system unity. He states that “[w]e need to relate concepts to practice and 
thus give them content. We need to relate practices to concepts in order to give practice 
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meaning and direction.”
229
 Principles and concepts are therefore an essential part of 
international law without which there can be no meaning and direction for practice. 
Principles and concepts are the important links uniting the growing number of specialized 
fields of law. Since, according to Martti Koskenniemi, there “[is] no meta-regime” in 
international law
 
,
230
 general principles and concepts can be used to increase our 
understanding and connect these different fields, as Schachter suggests.
231
 The precise 
way in which general principles can play a role in increasing our understanding can be 
seen through the other three functions. 
3.5.2 Gap-Filling Function 
            General principles “perform a gap-filling function where there is no customary or 
treaty law on the issue, or where a principle is required to decide which hierarchically 
equal norm should prevail in the event of a clash.”
232
 In doing so, general principles 
“prevent[s] decision-makers from either pronouncing a non liquet (failure to decide) or, 
worse, deciding the issue according to their personal whim.”
233
  This is one of the most 
common functions of general principles, second only perhaps to the interpretive function. 
Additionally, general principles can perform a gap-filling function to the point of being 
pseudo-decision-makers where there is a need to decide a conflict between norms.
234
 
Bassiouni suggests that general principles may fill gaps on “a more objective basis than 
the value-laden natural law philosophy espoused by some Continental and American 
scholars.
235
 In fact, the logical application of general principles to fill gaps in customary 
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and treaty law suggests it is “a source of law that overreaches other positive sources of 
international law, and eventually supersedes it.”
236
 
            Since gaps in positive international law do exist, there is need for something to fill 
these gaps, and general principles are the logical choice for that job. In fact, Bassiouni 
states, “[t]hat is why this source of law was included in article 38 of both the PCIJ and the 
ICJ Statutes.
237
 According to Ford, “[a]t the time the Statute of the PCIJ was drafted in 
1920, the idea that international tribunals could invoke general principles in order to fill 
gaps was already well established in certain international contexts.”
238
 Article 38(1)(c) of 
the ICJ Statute simply carried on this practice.
239
 Article 38(1)(c) is, in Ford’s words, “an 
express textual warrant for gap-filling judicial discretion.”
240
 This gap-filling function is 
ultimately articulated by the ICJ in the Right of Passage case, in which Judge Fernandes, 
in his dissenting opinion, stated that “[i]t frequently happens that a decision given on the 
basis of a particular or general convention or of a custom requires recourse to the general 
principles … A court will have recourse to those principles to fill gaps in the 
conventional rules, or to interpret them.”
241
 The ICJ did just that in the Corfu Channel 
case, where it relied upon a principle of the admissibility of indirect evidence to interpret 
the evidence admissible by Great Britain on the knowledge and responsibility of Albania 
for laying mines in the Corfu channel.
242
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3.5.3 Interpretive Function 
            The interpretive function is the most commonly employed use of general 
principles and, according to Bassiouni, “the one that is evidently the most needed and 
useful”.
243
 Raz concurs that this function is “of the utmost importance since it is a crucial 
device for ensuring coherence of purpose among various laws bearing on the same 
subject.”
244
 As such, it is also an important means of responding to fragmentation and 
performing the unification function of general principles. Though the “extent to which 
one can resort to ‘General Principles’ for interpretive purposes has never been 
established”
245
, these principles have nonetheless “been primarily used to clarify and 
interpret international law.”
246
 
            Some general principles are specifically interpretive in nature, such as the 
principle which dictates that special laws prevail over general ones (lex specialis 
derogate legi generali).
247
 Meanwhile other principles, such as the general principle of 
respect for human dignity, identified by the ICTY in the Furundzija case as “the basic 
underpinning and indeed the very raison d’être of international humanitarian law and 
human rights” was employed by that court to help interpret the international laws relating 
to rape.
248
 This use of general principles in Furundzija exemplifies Bassiouni’s assertion 
that “[t]hey are useful for interpreting words not susceptible to an ordinary or common 
meaning interpretation”.
249
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            Equally important when considering the interpretation of international law is the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [VCLT].
250
 Article 31(3) of the VCLT 
requires subsequent agreements, practices and rules of international law to be taken into 
account when interpreting a treaty.
251
 The ILC Study on Fragmentation devoted some 
time to discussing Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, which reads as follows: 
There shall be taken into account together with the context: 
… (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties.
252
 
The ILC refer to this article as an expression of a principle it calls the principle of  
“systemic integration”. The principle “points to the need to take into account the 
normative environment [of the obligations in question] more widely.”
253
 The aim is to 
ensure that provisions are interpreted “so as to see the rules in view of some 
comprehensible and coherent objective, to prioritize concerns that are more important at 
the cost of less important objectives.”
254
 This systemic nature of international law, 
integral to both interpretation and the unification of international law, can be anchored on 
this provision of the VCLT.
255
 It is important to note that, though the provision “refers to 
rules of international law in general, the words cover all the sources of international law, 
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including custom, general principles, and, where applicable, other treaties”.
256
 While, at 
first glance, there may seem to be confusion by the use of the term “rules”, in the 
following sentence the ILC clarifies that this is inclusive of custom and general 
principles, not merely rules founded in conventions.
257
 The ILC Study further elaborates 
that the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations perform a rather 
similar task in locating the treaty provision within a principled framework”.
258
  
            Within a fragmented international legal system consisting of so many specialized 
institutions, law must not be employed in isolation “only as an instrument for attaining 
regime-objectives.”
259
 Rather, “law is also about protecting rights and enforcing 
obligations, above all rights and obligations that have a backing in something like a 
general, public interest.”
260
 The ILC emphasizes that “[w]ithout the principle of 
‘systemic integration’ it would be impossible to give expression to and to keep alive, any 
sense of common good of humankind, not reducible to the good of any particular 
institution or ‘regime’.”
261
 The interpretation, and often by association the unification, 
functions of general principles are crucial to the exercise of international law and the 
preservation of the coherence of international law. 
3.5.4 Development Function 
            The final function of general principles is the development function, or as 
Bassiouni refers to it, the “growth function”.
262
 Essentially, general principles play a role 
in the development of international law.  Bassiouni, citing James Brierly, describes the 
function as “an authoritative recognition of a dynamic element in international law and of 
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the creative function of the courts which administer it.”
263
 Bassiouni also notes that many 
scholars see this “underlying role of ‘General Principles’ as necessary to the development 
of international law.”
264
 The reasoning behind this necessity is that “it would be stifling 
not to inject into the sources of any legal system the capability of growth and 
development.”
265
 This function of general principles therefore serves to provide a certain 
amount of dynamism in the operation of international law. 
            The development function provides for the possibility that existing general 
principles could form the basis for creating new rules of international law.
266
 Bassiouni 
goes so far as to say that the “development of new norms of conventional and customary 
law required the existence of ‘General Principles.’”
267
 Given the importance of this 
dynamism and evolution of international law, Bassiouni “assume[s] that the framers of 
both the PCIJ and ICJ Statutes anticipated the prospective need for evolution and change 
in the development of international law – as evidenced by […] article 38(1)(c).”
268
 Ford 
goes further, stating that the “drafters of Article 38 deliberately empowered future Courts 
‘to develop and refine the principles of international jurisprudence.’”
269
 
            The ICTY’s use of general principles in Furundzija, discussed above, is not only 
an example of the interpretive function of general principles but also an example of its 
development function. The Tribunal used the general principle of human dignity not only 
to interpret existing customary law on rape but also to develop the definition of rape in 
international law.
270
 In doing so, the Tribunal concluded that forced oral penetration did 
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constitute rape.
271
 The use of general principles allowed for continued development of 
international law. 
3.6 Custom or Principle?: The Relationship between 
Custom and General Principles 
            There is a strong relationship between customary law and general principles. The 
relationship is so strong that the line between them is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish.
272
 In fact, some general principles are both general principles and rules of 
customary international law at the same time.
273
 One such example provided by Boas is 
the rule/general principle of pacta sunt servanda (the principle that agreements must be 
kept).
274
 Furthermore, the concept of jus cogens or non-derogable principles, “is 
premised on the existence of a hierarchy of ‘General Principles.’”
275
 
            Another link between custom and principles is that general principles can play a 
role in the formation of customary international law. A general principle may provide 
evidence of custom through its consistent and/or widespread practice.
276
 General 
principles and custom can also both “apply to states that have not tacitly agreed to those 
particular norms” by virtue of the fact that their validity and binding nature “is a product 
of the common will of the international community”.
277
 Principles and custom are both 
evolutionary sources, the weight and influence of which develop over time.
278
  
            A key distinction between custom and principles, however, is that when custom is 
not perfected, “such as when a custom is not evidenced by sufficient or consistent 
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practice, or when States express opinio juris without any supportive practice”, the 
practice does not have the binding force of customary law, but the practice may 
nonetheless be representative of a general principle of international law.
279
 Ultimately, 
while general principles and customary international law may sometimes overlap, they 
both also play distinct and very important roles in the operation of international law. 
3.7 Hierarchy of Sources of International Law 
            Crucial to understanding the role of general principles in international law is not 
simply knowing how to identify them and how they function, but also knowing their 
weight and status within the realm of different sources of international law. Article 38(1) 
lists conventions, custom, general principles, judicial decisions and the writings of 
publicists as sources of international law. Based on the wording of the Article, the natural 
interpretation would be that conventions, custom and general principles are ‘primary’ 
sources of international law, this inference being drawn from the fact that the Article 
expressly states that judicial decisions and the writings of publicists are ‘subsidiary’ 
sources.
280
 In spite of what seems to be quite clear language, there exists a sense that 
treaty and custom are actually hierarchically superior to general principles.
281
 On the 
other hand, Boas suggests that “the gap-filling and tie-breaking function of general 
principles only indicates that this formal source operates in a different way and in a 
different sphere from that of treaty and custom”, rather than an hierarchically inferior 
fashion.
282
 Bassiouni also dismisses the suggestion that general principles are 
hierarchically inferior to custom and convention, noting that “in the context of legislative 
intent, it becomes evident that the drafters of article 38 of the PCIJ Statute never intended 
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to create a hierarchy of sources.”
283
 Rather, the drafters consciously omitted the words 
“in the order following” from the language of the Article.
284
 
            As the ILC notes in its Study on Fragmentation, “[t]here is no formal hierarchy 
between the sources of international law”, though it suggested that, nonetheless, there 
may be an informal hierarchy between sources.
285
 Instinctively, in looking to resolve an 
issue, there is a hierarchy, as conventional law is usually considered first, then customary 
international law, and then general principles.
286
 In reality, the different functions of each 
respective source of international law can often allow them to operate in conjunction with 
each other or in a symbiotic way. However, as Bassiouni points out, “[t]he choice of 
which functions ‘General Principles’ should assume is clearly predicated on whether 
‘General Principles’ are deemed a subsidiary or primary source of international law.”
287
  
As a primary source, general principles “may have a binding legal effect superior to that 
of positive normative rules of international law.”
288
 On the other hand, as a subsidiary 
source, general principles “are only appropriately resorted to for the purposes of 
explaining inadequacies in the positive normative law and can also occasionally fill gaps 
in these two primary sources.”
289
  
            This question regarding the binding nature of general principles is “well 
established and its hierarchical ranking has simply been left to the functional need for 
their application in specific cases.”
290
 The application by the PCIJ and ICJ in practice has 
“been cautious and [they] have often restricted ‘General Principles’ to a limited role that 
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some would see as a subsidiary function”.
291
 However, and as Bassiouni crucially notes, 
“one cannot rely on the caution of the courts as evidence that they intended to place 
‘General Principles’ in a subsidiary position to other sources of international law.”
292
 
Ultimately, there is great strength in the position that general principles are a primary 
source based on the language of Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. 
3.8 General Principles: The Soft Law Argument 
            As noted above, there are some who feel general principles are more of a 
subsidiary, or non-binding, source of international law rather than a primary source equal 
in stature to custom and treaty. Proponents of this position argue that treaty and custom 
are inherently more representative of the will of states.
293
 As such, they feel that these 
sources should be prioritized over general principles and general principles should take 
on a lesser role entailing merely “explaining inadequacies in the positive normative law 
and […] also occasionally fill gaps in these two primary sources.”
294
 While the 
legitimacy of such claims is questionable, given the above discussion on the hierarchy of 
sources, it is nonetheless useful to examine the role of general principles if they are 
indeed a lesser or non-binding source of law. 
            There is an increasing tendency in several areas of law to “place normative 
statements and agreements in nonlegally binding or politically instruments such as 
declarations, resolutions, and programs of action.”
295
 Such non-binding instruments are 
commonly referred to as soft law. In actuality “there is no accepted definition of ‘soft 
law’, but it usually refers to any international instrument other than a treaty that contains 
principles, norms, standards, or other statements of expected behavior.”
296
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            General principles stated in soft law documents can still be powerful tools of 
evidence of existing law, or can be demonstrative of opinio juris or state practice leading 
to the formation of new customary law.
297
 As Alan Boyle notes, once soft law begins to 
interact with binding instruments - for example, in the case of intergenerational equity in 
Article 3(1) of the 1992 Climate Change Convention - the non-binding character of soft 
law may be lost or altered.
298
 This indicates that principles in soft law documents can 
evolve into binding norms.  Principles expressed in soft law documents can also still play 
a very important role based on the influence they can exert on the interpretation, 
application and development of other rules of law.
299
 For example, Article 31(3) of the 
VCLT calls upon such principles to be taken into account when interpreting a treaty.
300
 
            The usefulness of principles in international law expressed in a soft law document 
has also been articulated by Susan Marks.
301
 Marks comments on how principles 
expressed in soft law documents can be useful as tools for the interpretation, application 
and articulation of international law.
302
 They can also be used to reinforce trends already 
in existence in international law.
303
 While Marks’ comments center around a proposed 
principle of democratic inclusion, they are equally pertinent to the importance and 
usefulness of other soft law principles. 
            Whether general principles are considered binding or non-binding in nature, they 
are also widely recognized across cultures and states.
304
 As well, they often have a strong 
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normative content around which non-governmental organizations [NGOs], the public and 
states can easily rally. As Alan Boyle notes, “soft law instruments can thus become 
vehicles for focusing consensus on rules and principles, and for mobilizing a consistent, 
general response on the part of States”.305 As such, even though it seems more likely that 
general principles have at least some, if not complete binding force, they can be powerful 
tools for the application and interpretation of international law whether they form part of 
soft or hard law. 
3.9 Conclusion 
            This chapter has explored the nature of general principles of law as a source found 
in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute. While there may not be one concise and precise 
definition of ‘general principles’, there are certain key characteristics they embody. These 
characteristics include: they are more general in nature than custom and convention; they 
are abstract; and they do not require universal acceptance. These characteristics lend 
themselves to identifying general principles not simply and strictly in one area, such as 
the national laws of states, but in multiple areas that also include principles intrinsic to 
the very idea of law, and principles found in international law itself. Furthermore, general 
principles perform multiple important functions in international law. They help to unify 
what seems to be a fragmented system of different specializations; they fill gaps in 
existing international law; they help to interpret existing laws; and they help to continue 
the growth and development of international law. 
            With this understanding of general principles in mind, the next chapters will turn 
to examining the two principles being used in this thesis: the principle of 
intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle, both principles found in 
international environmental and international sustainable development law. This chapter 
has demonstrated that general principles of international law can serve many important 
functions. They can be extremely useful tools for uniting international law as well as 
interpreting and applying international law. This will be of particular importance in the 
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remaining chapters of this thesis because it illustrates how intergenerational equity and 
the precautionary principle, as general principles of international law, can have the ability 
to influence other areas of law, such as international humanitarian law.  
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Chapter 4  
4 International Environmental Law: Exploring Sustainable 
Development and Intergenerational Equity 
4.1 Introduction 
            This chapter transitions into the realm of international environmental law (IEL). It 
begins with an introduction to the field of IEL as well as its important links to sustainable 
development. It then explores in some depth a principle of IEL and an integral part of 
sustainable development, the principle of intergenerational equity. This principle 
considers both long-term and short-term threats and harms. Not only is this relevant in 
the realm of environmental law, but also in the realm of human rights, a link that will be 
explored in the final part of the chapter. 
4.2 International Environmental Law & Sustainable 
Development 
4.2.1 International Environmental Law 
            International environmental law (IEL) is a relatively young area of law, growing 
out of mounting environmental concerns in the 1960s and evolving and building into 
today’s increasingly important body of law.
306
 Its primary goal is the protection of the 
environment. In protecting the environment, instruments, policies, principles and rules of 
IEL focus on a broad range of issues: from health, to the conservation of flora and fauna, 
to the ocean, to the atmosphere.
307
 The protection of the environment touches on a 
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myriad of areas because there is little to no action that does not have an effect, to one 
degree or another, on some aspect of the environment.
308
 Furthermore, “[e]nvironmental 
problems present a moving target” because “not only does scientific understanding 
develop, [but] environmental problems themselves change as human behaviour and 
technology change.”
309
 These problems oftentimes will not be contained by the borders 
on a map. Many environmental problems have “effects that are widely dispersed and long 
term, with long latency periods.”
310
 Sometimes these effects are irreversible.
311
 
            It is this nature of environmental problems that IEL seeks to address. The broad, 
all-encompassing, transitory, scientifically uncertain, long-lasting and potentially 
irreversible nature of environmental problems requires IEL to continue to adapt, adopt 
and create its own tools to meet the needs of the environment and humanity. More often 
than not, though, it is human needs that are the primary justification for, or reasoning 
behind, IEL efforts. As Alan Boyle notes, “[i]nternational environmental law is 
essentially anthropocentric rather than radically ecocentric in character.”
312
 This 
anthropocentric focus means that environmental protections are often based upon human 
self-interest and/or cultural, economic or aesthetic needs, uses and benefits of the 
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environment.
313
 However, it must also be noted, that some scholars emphasize an 
increasing development in IEL which embraces a more ecocentric approach, valuing and 
promoting the protection of the environment for its own intrinsic worth.
314
 
            These tools include both binding treaties and non-binding declarations and 
resolutions. An excellent example of the production of both treaties and declarations 
came out of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held 
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil [Rio Conference]. Both the UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity
315
 and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC)
316
 were 
opened for signatures at the Rio Conference and are now binding IEL treaties. On the 
non-binding side, Agenda 21,
317
 dealing with sustainable development, and the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration),
318
 27 principles on 
environment and development, were negotiated and produced at the Rio Conference. 
While the instruments themselves are non-binding, their content carries much weight, 
with many principles contained in them having achieved binding customary law status.
319
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            Tools of IEL include instruments produced by states
320
 as well as those produced 
by experts.
321
 As Dupuy notes, “resolutions adopted by experts […], although they are 
less authoritative than those negotiated by state delegations[…], can be extremely 
influential in legitimizing and shaping successive legal developments.”
322
 Furthermore, 
“resolutions adopted by states indicate how international law can evolve, whereas those 
adopted by experts indicate how international law should evolve.”
323
 As with many areas 
of law, IEL requires the participation and consent of states as well as the expertise and 
opinion of experts in order to provide protection for the environment, to fully consider 
the many interests at stake, and to benefit from the different knowledge bases available in 
the realm of environmental protection. 
            While IEL benefits from both binding and non-binding instruments produced by 
both states and experts, it lacks “an integrated UN special agency that could serve as an 
‘umbrella organization’ for coordinating environmental policies, integrating legislation, 
and monitoring implementation.”
324
 Given this lack of umbrella organization, Dupuy 
suggests that “general customary rules and general principles may act, in part at least, as 
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compensation for the institutional deficiencies of the system.”
325
 Indeed, IEL has a large 
number of general rules or principles and they are often the focus of academic discussion. 
Sands et al. focus on seven “general rules and principles that have broad, if not 
necessarily universal, support and are frequently endorsed in practice.”
326
 The general 
rules and principles that are the focus of academic discussion are: 
(1) the obligation reflected in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration 
and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, namely, that states have 
sovereignty over their natural resources and the responsibility not to cause 
transboundary damage; 
(2) the principle of preventive action; 
(3) the principle of co-operation; 
(4) the principle of sustainable development; 
(5) the precautionary principle; 
(6) the polluter pays principle; and 
(7) the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.
327
 
Ellis and Wood, meanwhile, focus on a non-exhaustive list of nine principles: prevention, 
equitable balancing of interests, precaution, common concern of humankind, common but 
differentiated obligations, co-operation, prior notice and consultation, prior informed 
consent and environmental impact assessments.
328
 While there are some specific 
principles in common to the lists, others, such as sustainable development in the first list, 
incorporates or includes principles from the Ellis and Wood list, such as the equitable 
balancing of interests. 
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4.2.2 Sustainable Development as Encompassing International 
Environmental Law 
            Many principles of IEL are also encompassed in sustainable development. Ellis 
and Wood state that “[i]t is possible to view all the legal principles [listed above] as 
segments of a wide, over-arching principle […]: ‘sustainable development’ (or 
‘sustainability’).”
329
 Sustainable development is most commonly defined by its earliest 
definition in the Brundtland Report (1987) by the World Commission on Environment 
and Development: “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.
330
 It seeks to 
balance economic and social development with environmental protection, both in the 
short- and long-term. Though this basic understanding of sustainable development exists, 
it is nonetheless “highly susceptible to varied explanations”
331
 and “[i]t is subject to 
considerable uncertainty as to its exact meaning and scope.”
332
 
            Also subject to great academic discussion is whether sustainable development is a 
body of law unto itself, a mere concept, or a principle. Each possibility receives support 
in the academic literature. Sands et al. discuss the “law of sustainable development”
333
, 
while French refers to “the notion, the principle – if not now – the mantra of sustainable 
development”.
334
 For Boyle and Freestone, sustainable development is a “concept”
335
. 
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Beyerlin
336
, Dupuy
337
, and Das all also label it a “concept”, though Das qualifies it as a 
“holistic concept”.
338
 This classification as a concept appears to also be supported by the 
majority decision in the ICJ’s decision in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros.
339
 Judge 
Weeramantry’s Separate Opinion in this case, however, states that sustainable 
development is “more than a mere concept, but as a principle with normative value”.
340
  
            Judge Weeramantry also describes sustainable development as a “principle of 
reconciliation”.
341
 This idea of reconciliation can also be found in the description of 
sustainable development by Lowe, Magraw and Hawke, and Ellis. Lowe uses the term 
“metaprinciple” and “modifying norm” which “[acts] upon other legal rules and 
principles” and “establish[es] the relationships between other, primary norms.”
342
 
Magraw and Hawke describe the “paradigm of sustainable development” as an “over-
arching framework for improving quality of life throughout the world”.
343
 Finally, for 
Ellis it is also an “over-arching concept”
344
 that “informs and influences the development 
and interpretation of international law.”
345
 While they use different terminology, the 
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common thread to these conceptions of sustainable development is the over-arching, 
reconciling or unifying capacity of the idea. 
            While it is clear that the precise label for sustainable development remains 
unsettled, there is also debate as to what is its legal weight. Sands et al. boldly assert that 
“[t]here can be little doubt that the concept of ‘sustainable development’ has entered the 
corpus of international customary law”.
346
 Many other scholars, however, do not seem so 
certain that such a status in international law has been achieved. Das takes the complete 
opposite position, stating that sustainable development is “devoid of binding international 
legal status”.
347
 Meanwhile, Ellis states that “though it does not itself have the status of a 
legal norm, [it] has immense actual and potential significance to legal norms and 
institutions.”
348
 In any case, French aptly points out that “the question of its legal status 
should in no way be considered determinative of its legal influence.”
349
 
            French’s statement is both noteworthy and accurate, since whatever label is 
attached to it, or whether it has binding or non-binding legal effect, in practice it seems to 
play a very similar role to general principles of international law, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. It takes on an interpretive role, guiding the understanding and 
application of other rules, principles and concepts of IEL and other areas of international 
law. As Ellis states, it “provide[s] guidance on analysing factual situations and 
identifying particularly salient features of those situations; assigning weight to different 
considerations; and interpreting the often more specific and elaborate guidance provided 
by rules.”
350
 In doing so, it fulfills the important unifying function in a complex 
international legal system. 
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            As Philippe Sands notes, “[t]he world of international law is invariably presented 
as one in which various substantive subject-matter areas exist in quasi-hermetical 
isolation” where they are “taught and treated as discrete areas, subject to their own norms 
and institutional structures.”
351
 In reality, however, “[n]orms arising in different subject-
matter areas can and do touch. They co-mingle and they compete. These apparently 
distinct subject-matter areas do not exist in a state of isolation.”
352
 The unifying function 
is key to Ellis’ understanding of sustainable development. She states that “[i]ntegration is 
at the heart of sustainable development” as it is a “concept of reconciliation and 
harmonisation among environmental, economic and social fields.”
353
  
            In bringing together environment, economy and society, sustainable development 
provides an over-arching principle (or concept or body of law) which embodies the 
reality of the environment in day-to-day life: it affects numerous, if not all, aspects of life 
and, therefore, areas which fall under other legal regimes in addition to environmental 
law. Judge Weeramantry, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, notes links between 
sustainable development and “human rights, State responsibility, environmental law, 
economic and industrial law, equity, territorial Sovereignty, abuse of rights, good 
neighbourliness – to mention a few”.
354
 Of particular interest in this thesis are the links 
sustainable developments helps to clarify between human rights, armed conflict, and the 
environment. Not only is there increasing debate over whether a ‘right to a healthy 
environment’ exists, but there is also significant support showing how environmental 
degradation can negatively impact the realization of human rights such as the rights to 
life, health home life, and property.
355
 The connections between these areas of law and 
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IEL clearly exist - sustainable development provides, perhaps, the most direct route 
between them all. 
            This route provided by sustainable development finds clear expression in Judge 
Weermantry’ Separate Opinion in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case in which he 
champions both the right to development and the right to environmental protection as 
important principles in current international law.
356
 Yet, these rights cannot be realized in 
isolation from each other, it is essential to “achiev[e] a blend of the concepts of 
development and of conservation of the environment, which alone does justice to 
humanity’s obligations to itself and […] to the planet which is its home”.357 This 
demands seeing the bigger picture, the interconnectedness of environment and 
development and all the associated rights and responsibilities, benefits and consequences. 
Environmental protection is not merely about saving trees, it is also about a right to clean 
water, health care, education and development. Environmental protection has no borders - 
it applies everywhere, and it is always necessary, in peacetime and during conflict. 
Unfortunately, seeing this bigger picture often seems more difficult for those of us in the 
Global North and who do not deal on a daily basis with the great domino effect 
environmental degradation can have on every aspect of one’s life. As Karin Mickelson 
notes, “[f]or more than thirty years, the South has been attempting to convey the 
desperate circumstances in which many of its peoples exist and to convince the 
international community of the ways in which these circumstances are inextricably 
connected with environmental degradation.”358 We need to conceive of the ‘environment’ 
more broadly, “[e]nvironmental problems have to be addressed, but not in isolation from 
a host of other factors. They need to be understood in a broader economic, social, 
cultural, and historic context.”359 
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4.2.3 Conclusion 
            Sustainable development and IEL are closely linked. Environmental protection is 
a key priority in both areas. Many of the principles and concepts that make up sustainable 
development are also principles of IEL. Two such principles are the principle of 
intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle, which will both be explored in 
greater depth in this thesis. Examining these principles through the lens of sustainable 
development, in addition to their place in IEL, allows us to more clearly see the strong 
links between them and other areas of international law such as human rights and 
international humanitarian law. With this foundation, we can now turn to examining the 
first principle of focus in this thesis, the principle of intergenerational equity. 
4.3 Intergenerational Equity 
            In an increasingly complex world where everything from technology to 
communication to the environment is changing rapidly, it is unsurprising that individuals, 
governments and decision-makers may sometimes feel at a loss to keep pace. It is for this 
very reason that it is increasingly crucial to consciously take into account the future 
implications of our decisions. In day-to-day life people benefit from the many natural 
resources available to allow fuel for cooking, water for bathing, and energy for the 
production of so many products relied upon everyday. People, particularly those living in 
the developed world, often take for granted the accessibility of these resources and the 
ability of the planet to provide all the necessary comforts depended upon. At the same 
time, many people lament the depleting ozone, melting icecaps, acid rain, and dwindling 
forests that decision-makers of past generations have burdened us with in the present. 
Much as the decisions of the past leave their mark on us in the present, so will our 
decisions leave their mark on the planet we pass on to subsequent generations. It is 
precisely this context in which the principle of intergenerational equity arises to help 
emphasize the importance of making decisions based not solely on short-term 
consequences, needs and interests, but also in light of considerations for future 
generations. The principle of intergenerational equity, also known as the Future 
Generations principle, focuses on the need of each generation to preserve the planet’s 
natural and cultural heritage for future generations, balancing present needs with the 
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responsibility to pass on the planet to subsequent generations in as good, or better, 
condition as it was received from prior generations.
360
 
4.3.1 Defining Intergenerational Equity 
            In the simplest of terms, intergenerational equity is the responsibility of current 
generations to future generations for the protection and preservation of the environment. 
At the core of the concept is a strong temporal element with the idea that “each 
generation receives a natural and cultural legacy in trust from previous generations and 
holds it in trust for future generations.”
361
 Intergenerational equity provides each 
generation with both rights and responsibilities for the environment. Edith Brown Weiss 
refers to this as “rights of access to and use of property, which are coupled with 
obligations to conserve that property.”
362
 Each generation has the right to use and benefit 
from the environment they have received from previous generations. At the same time, 
each generation’s rights are restricted by their responsibility to succeeding generations. 
The rights of current generations must be exercised in a manner that will ensure they pass 
on to subsequent generations a world whose cultural and natural environment is in as 
good, or better, condition as when they themselves received it from preceding 
generations.
363
 Present generations are not entitled to act in ways that could “deprive 
future generations of environmental, social and economic opportunities of well-being.”
364
 
A recognition embodied in intergenerational equity is that “our actions today pose long-
term risks to the health of our planet and to our cultural resource base for which the 
                                                 
360
 Weiss (1989), supra note 8. 
361
 Weiss (1989), ibid at 2. 
362
 Weiss (1989), ibid at 17. 
363
 Edith Brown Weiss, “Intergenerational equity: a legal framework for global environmental change” in 
Edith Brown Weiss, ed, Environmental change and international law: New challenges and dimensions, 
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1992). [hereinafter Weiss (1992)] 
364
 Sébastien Jodoin and Yolanda Saito, “Crimes Against Future Generations: Harnessing the Potential of 
Individual Criminal Accountability for Global Sustainability” (2011-2012) 7 McGill Int'l J. Sust. Dev. L. & 
Pol'y 115 at 130 [hereinafter Jodoin & Saito](citing Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Ashfaq Khalfan, 
Sustainable Development Law: Principles, Practices&Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)). 
84 
 
present generation will be unable to compensate future generations.”
365
 People are both 
custodians of the planet and users of its resources, according to Brown, which means that 
as custodians humans have certain “moral obligations to future generations” and these 
obligations can be transformed into “legally enforceable norms.”
366
 At the same time, “as 
beneficiaries of the legacy of past generations, [humans] inherit certain rights to enjoy the 
fruits of this legacy, as do future generations.”
367
 
            Edith Brown Weiss, one of the most prolific writers in the area of 
intergenerational equity, identifies three kinds of equity problems between generations: i) 
the depletion of resources for future generations; ii) the degradation in the quality of 
resources for future generations; and, iii) access to use and benefits of the resources 
received from past generations.
368
 If preceding generations fail in their responsibilities to 
subsequent generations, it is these subsequent generations who will bear the burden of 
increased costs
369
 and who will suffer the loss of natural resources and cultural heritage. 
This cultural heritage is composed of different cultural resources, such as “knowledge 
about economic, political and social systems, including archives and historical records, 
about languages, works of art, musical compositions, literary works, architectural 
treasures, and monuments.”
370
 Concerns on the environmental side of the concept range 
from the over-consumption and depletion of resources, to the degradation of environment 
through waste disposal and the destruction of environmental services provided by forests, 
soils and watersheds.
371
 
             Ultimately, the concept of intergenerational equity encompasses a strong 
temporal element requiring actors to consider both short and long-term consequences of 
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their actions within the context of protection of both natural and cultural environments. 
As both beneficiaries, from prior generations, and trustees, on behalf of future 
generations, of these environments we, the current generation, must examine our actions 
in light of their immediate effects as well as how these actions will affect these resources 
over time and spanning generations. The concept is beautifully summed up by Alexandre 
Kiss and Dinah Shelton, who state,  
. . . [E]ach generation has the right to benefit from and develop 
the natural and cultural patrimony inherited from previous 
generations in such a manner that it can be passed on to future 
generations in no worse condition than it was received. This 
requires conservation of renewable resources, of ecosystems and 
of life-support processes, as well as human knowledge and art. It 
requires the avoidance of actions with harmful and irreversible 
consequences for the natural and cultural heritage.
372
 
4.3.2 The History of Evolution of Intergenerational Equity 
            Having established a basic understanding of the meaning and content of the 
concept of intergenerational equity, this section turns to its history and evolution in 
international environmental law. Quite interestingly, “there is no society that has not, in 
some way, applied the principle of current generations being responsible to future 
generations” in some form or another.
373
 As Edith Brown Weiss notes, the concept of 
intergenerational equity, with the “fundamental thesis that we have obligations to 
conserve the planet for future generations and rights to have access to its benefits”, can be 
found in the “diverse legal traditions of the international community.”
374
 
Intergenerational equity can be found in “the common law and civil law traditions, in 
Islamic law, in African customary law, and in Asian nontheistic traditions.”
375
 These 
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broad roots are useful in efforts to promote and strengthen the concept in modern 
international law. 
            Within international law, the first documented use of intergenerational equity was 
by the United States of America in the Pacific Fur Seals Arbitration in 1893. Its first 
appearance in an international convention occurred in the 1946 International Whaling 
Convention, the preamble to which states that, “Recognizing the interest of the nations of 
the world in safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources represented 
by whale stocks”.
376
 The frequency with which the concept was incorporated into 
international conventions increased in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, first with the 
1968 African Conservation Convention
377
 and the 1972 World Heritage Convention 
[Heritage Convention].
378
 The Heritage Convention incorporates the idea of not only 
preserving the natural environmental but also cultural heritage in Article 4, which states 
that parties to the convention recognize the “duty of ensuring the identification, 
protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the 
cultural and natural heritage”.
379
 The concept can also be found in Principle 1 of the 
Stockholm Declaration of 1972, produced at the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment that year, stating that, “man bears a solemn responsibility to protect 
and improve the environment for present and future generations.”
380
 
            Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of intergenerational equity 
continued to appear in international conventions, many of which dealt with specific areas 
of environmental protection. References to intergenerational equity can be seen in the 
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preambles to conventions addressing the protection of endangered species of flora and 
fauna;
381
 essential renewable natural resources;
382
 the environment generally;
383
 the 
marine environment;
384
 the resources of the Earth;
385
 natural heritage;
386
 and natural 
resources.
387
 The increasing reliance and use of intergenerational equity in international 
law through these decades demonstrates an increased awareness about human impact on 
the environment not only for current generations but also for continuing impacts on 
future generations. In order to preserve these valuable resources, increased action for 
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their protection was needed and realized in increasing international legal efforts for 
conservation, protection and preservation. 
            This increasing environmental awareness of the 1970s and 1980s culminated with 
the 1987 Brundtland Report, issued by the United Nations and written by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). The report provided insight 
into the (perhaps) competing interests of environmental protection and development. 
Notably the report further developed the idea of sustainable development, stating 
“Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs.”
388
 Crucially, the report places intergenerational equity at the epicenter of 
how it defines sustainable development and the key to ongoing environmental protection. 
            Sustainable development and intergenerational equity continued to influence 
international environmental law in the 1990s. In 1992, three environmental conventions 
and one declaration were issued. The 1992 Biological Diversity Convention’s preamble 
stated the parties were “[d]etermined to conserve and sustainably use biological diversity 
for the benefit of present and future generations.”
389
 Meanwhile, Article 2(5)(c) of the 
1992 Transboundary Waters Convention stated that “[i]n taking measures referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article, the Parties shall be guided by the following principles: 
[…] (c) Water resources shall be managed so that the needs of the present generation are 
met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”
390
 
Article 3(1) of the 1992 Climate Change Convention stated that “[i]n their actions to 
achieve the objective of the Convention and to implement its provisions, the Parties shall 
be guided, inter alia, by the following: 1. The Parties should protect the climate system 
for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and 
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in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities.”
391
 Finally, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
[Rio Declaration] enshrined intergenerational equity in Principle 3 which states that 
“[t]he right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and 
environmental needs of present and future generations.”
392
 
            The use, reliance and appearance of intergenerational equity in international law 
has not been restricted to preambular statements in international Conventions and 
Declarations; it has also appeared in cases and advisory opinions of the International 
Court of Justice [ICJ].  Two such instances are the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
393
 in 1996 and the 1997 Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros
394
 case between Hungary and Slovakia. In the former, the ICJ noted that “the 
environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and 
the very health of human beings, including generations unborn.”
395
 In the latter case, the 
Court acknowledged and relied upon sustainable development in its judgment,
396
 with 
Vice-President Weeramantry noting in his Separate Opinion that “the principle of 
sustainable development is … a part of modern international law by reason not only of its 
inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of its wide and general acceptance by 
the global community.”
397
 As seen in the definition of sustainable development in the 
Brundtland Report,
398
 and as can be seen in the characterization of sustainable 
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development by other international legal scholars such as Philippe Sands,
399
 
intergenerational equity is an integral and strong component of sustainable development.  
As such, support for sustainable development can arguably be interpreted as 
strengthening the status and presence in international law of intergenerational equity. 
4.3.3 The Current Legal Status of Intergenerational Equity 
            While the growth of the presence of, and reliance on, intergenerational equity in 
international environmental law suggests an ongoing strengthening of its status in 
international law, it is unlikely that it has achieved customary law status. As Judge 
Weeramantry notes in his dissenting opinion in the ICJ’s 1995 Nuclear Tests Case Order, 
intergenerational equity is “an important and rapidly developing principle of 
contemporary environmental law.”
400
 The more recent work of Sébastien Jodoin and 
Yolanda Saito suggests that the status continues along the lines noted by Judge 
Weeramantry, as they write that,  
[a]lthough the principle of intergenerational equity has not yet 
achieved the status of customary international law, the protection 
of the interests of future generations undoubtedly forms an 
important value and concern of the international community, 
informing developments in contemporary international law.
401
 
As previously noted, the majority of references in international law to intergenerational 
equity can be found in the preambles to international conventions. The preamble to a 
treaty or convention “stat[es] the reasons for and underlying understandings of the 
drafters and adopters of the instrument”
402
 and also tends to provide an “express or? 
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explicit general statement of the treaty’s objects and purposes.”
403
 Thus, the inclusion of 
intergenerational equity in the preambles of international conventions is important 
because it provides an over-arching objective or guide for the substantive obligations to 
be carried out under that convention. It appears that intergenerational equity is a strongly 
established principle of international environmental law and one that continues to be used 
in international conventions, declarations and legal cases. 
4.3.4 Intergenerational Equity and Human Rights 
            The principle of intergenerational equity is one explicitly invoked in 
environmental protection, but it is often invoked, sometimes implicitly, in international 
human rights law. It benefits rights which are directly linked to environmental and 
cultural protections, but it also aids the realization of other human rights which benefit 
from the consideration of long-term and short-term impacts of actions. This section will 
explore the explicit link between intergenerational equity, children’s rights and the 
environment, as well as how, the principle of intergenerational equity is implicitly 
interlinked with the right to health. 
            While debates over universality and cultural relativity persist in the field of 
human rights law,
404
 incorporating the principle of intergenerational equity should be a 
less contentious suggestion given that the principle has roots in the many different legal 
and philosophical traditions of the world.
405
 That this concept has broad foundations in 
different cultures makes it a more easily incorporated and adapted principle for the 
implementation of human rights. 
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            The rights of children are an excellent example of an area in which 
intergenerational equity can be seen and applied, not only in its traditional milieu of 
natural environment and cultural heritage, but also in a broader human rights sense. 
Arguably, children can be seen as both a current and future generation. They are a current 
generation in that they are alive and existing currently with rights and invested interests 
in the environment, their culture, and their own well-being. However, they are also a 
future generation because more often than not they do not yet have a direct voice or role 
in the institutions and decision-making processes designed for the use of natural 
resources and the protection of human rights. These aspects remain the purview of adults 
who have reached the age of majority and can directly participate, or indirectly have a say 
through voting. It is for this reason that intergenerational equity can and does play an 
integral role in our approach to the rights of children: We must consider not just the 
present implications of failures to protect the rights of children but also the implications 
of such failures in the future for both the present generation of children and future 
generations to come.   
            The rights of children from the traditional environmental perspective are evident 
in the domestic case of Oposa v Factoran
406
 in the Philippines.   
            In March 1990, a domestic case was brought in the Philippines by an 
environmental non-governmental organization [NGO], the Philippine Ecological 
Network (PEN) and its president, Antonio Oposa, on behalf of a group of children and 
future generations. Grounded on a constitutional right to a ‘balanced and healthful 
ecology’
407
 the complainants argued that the continued destruction of the Philippines’ 
old-growth rainforests would deprive them and future generations of their right to a 
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‘balanced and healthful ecology’. The Supreme Court of the Philippines granted standing 
to the children and the NGO stating, 
We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, 
for others of their generation and for the succeeding 
generations, file a class suit.  Their personality to sue on 
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on 
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the 
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
408
 
This case represents an important development in the trajectory of the principle of 
intergenerational equity: it was the “first time that a nation’s highest court has explicitly 
granted legal standing to representatives of future generations.”
409
 Furthermore, the case 
is important for its recognition of the fact that “the interests of future generations are not 
abstract or unascertainable, but can be identified and advocated by a legal 
representative.”
410
  
            Current and future generations children have a vested interest in both reaping the 
benefits of the environment and natural resources and in protecting these resources since 
they will eventually become responsible for passing on the planet in good condition to 
succeeding generations. The decisions made by those currently in power, therefore, have 
both immediate and lasting effects on children throughout lives, affecting their ability to 
fulfill their responsibilities to future generations.  
            A similar analysis applies to the right to health. Pollution and environmental 
degradation are increasingly discussed in the context of the right to health.
411
 As Laura 
Westra notes, the protection of other human rights “mean little if the child is born with 
serious mental, physical or emotional challenges, often irreversible, based on pre-birth or 
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other early environmental exposure.”
412
 The important link between environmental 
protection and the right to health, as well as other human rights, can be found in Justice 
Weeramantry’s decision in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case before the International Court 
of Justice [ICJ].  Justice Weeramantry stated that,  
The protection of the environment is … a vital part of 
contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non 
for numerous human rights such as the right to health and 
the right to life itself. It is scarcely necessary to elaborate on 
this, as damage to the environment can impair and 
undermine all the human rights spoken of in the Universal 
Declaration and other human rights instruments.
413
 
             The right to health is enshrined in Article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR] which recognizes “the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”
414
 
This specifically includes the “healthy development of the child”,
415
 “[t]he improvement 
of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene”
416
, “[t]he prevention, treatment 
and control of […]diseases”
417
, and “[t]he creation of conditions which would assure to 
all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness”.
418
 This right to health 
is echoed in Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
419
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            Intergenerational equity can and does play an important role in the application of 
the right to health, particularly in the context of children, because failure to adequately 
fulfill this right for children can have negative lifelong, as well as potentially 
intergenerational, impacts. The World Health Organization notes that “[m]any challenges 
faced by adults[…] can be traced back to early childhood.”
420
 It must be noted that there 
are often close links between poverty and poor health which are simultaneously 
perpetuated through lifetimes and between generations. The impacts of such chronic 
poverty “include poor nutrition and chronic ill-health, low educational achievement, 
psychological harm and low aspirations.”
421
 The links between poverty and poor health 
are strong, for example, poverty often makes it difficult to secure adequate nutrition, “an 
area where damage in early childhood can have some of the most significant effects on an 
individual’s well-being, and that of the next generation.”
422
 
            In 2011 approximately 1.5 million children died from preventable diseases
423
 and 
approximately 6.9 million children under 5, which equates to nearly 800 per hour, 
died.
424
 At the most basic level, failure to adequately fulfill the right to health for 
children denies the possibility of existence for members of future generations. A child 
that never gets the chance to grow up will never have the chance to participate in the 
protection of the environment and rights for others, will never have the chance to have 
children themselves. The right to health is not merely a right that affects current 
generations, but a right, the fulfillment of which, has implications throughout the life of 
the present generation and potentially ongoing impacts for future generations. 
                                                 
420
 World Health Organization, “Early Childhood Development” available at: 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs332/en/index.html. 
421
 Caroline Harper, Rachel Marcus, and Karen Moore, “Enduring Poverty and the Conditions of 
Childhood: Lifecourse and Intergenerational Poverty Transmissions” (2003) 31:3 World Development 535 
at 536. [hereinafter Harper et al.] 
422
 Harper et al., ibid at 542. 
423
 UNICEF, “Immunization: Facts and Figures April 2013” available at: 
http://www.unicef.org/immunization/files/UNICEF_Key_facts_and_figures_on_Immunization_April_2013
(1).pdf. 
424
 World Health Organization, “Child Mortality and Causes of Death” available at: 
http://www.who.int/gho/child_health/mortality/en/index.html. 
96 
 
            The intergenerational impacts of inadequate realization of rights to health and a 
clean environment are only exacerbated in the context of armed conflict. Warfare is not 
only inherently destructive of the environment, it also threatens numerous human rights. 
A resolution adopted at the 1968 International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran 
noted that “peace is the underlying condition for the full observance of human rights and 
war is their negation”.425 More recently, the NGO Amnesty International has noted that 
“[w]here wars erupt, suffering and hardship invariably follow. Conflict is the breeding 
ground for mass violations of human rights including unlawful killings, torture, forced 
displacement and starvation.”426 However, it is not simply these most egregious 
violations of human rights which occur in periods of conflict. Rather, armed conflict has 
the potential to jeopardize all human rights. For example, weapons which endanger the 
environment also threaten the right to health both directly and through potential 
contamination of water supplies and food sources. Attacks destroy infrastructure and 
buildings, such as hospitals and schools. The general insecurity produced in regions 
embroiled in conflict infringes on the ability to realize “enjoy economic, social, cultural 
and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedom can be 
fully realized.”427 The effects of war on human rights often persist long after the conflict 
has officially ended.
428
 These lasting effects are why intergenerational equity 
considerations play an important role in the protection and realization of human rights not 
merely in peacetime but also in periods of conflict. 
4.4 Conclusion 
            The principle of intergenerational equity may have arisen in recent decades in the 
field of environmental law and sustainable development, but it has the potential to inform 
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other areas of law such as international human rights law and humanitarian law. The 
benefits and importance of considering the long-term effects and repercussions of 
decisions made in the present are manifold. It is not merely useful when dealing with the 
protection and preservation of our planet’s natural and cultural heritage, but it is also 
beneficial for other aspects of our well-being, such as health, education, and general 
development. Broadening the application of intergenerational equity into human rights 
and IHL is an ideal way to improve human rights not only in the present, but for future 
generations by helping to put an end to the perpetuation of disadvantage and harms. 
            This chapter has provided a foundation in international environmental law and 
explored its links to sustainable development and, consequently, to armed conflict. It has 
also examined the principle of intergenerational equity. Intergenerational equity is a 
general principle of international environmental law which necessitates considering the 
short and long-term consequences of actions. There is an obligation to preserve the planet 
not only for the present generation, but also for future generations. This realization is not 
merely helpful for the protection of the environment, but also the protection of human 
rights. Similarly, this way of thinking has important potential for guiding military actions 
in armed conflicts in accordance with the rules of international humanitarian law which 
protect the environment and humans. The next chapter will build on this understanding of 
international environmental law by exploring the second principle of focus: the 
precautionary principle. 
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Chapter 5  
5 The Precautionary Principle in International 
Environmental Law 
All scientific work is incomplete – whether it be 
observational or experimental. All scientific work is 
liable to be upset or modified by advancing knowledge. 
That does not confer upon us a freedom to ignore the 
knowledge we already have or to postpone the action 
that it appears to demand at a given time. 
    Sir Bradford Hill
429
 
5.1 Introduction 
            This chapter returns to the realm of international environmental law, but shifts 
focus from the principle of intergenerational equity to the second key principle relied 
upon in this thesis: the precautionary principle. Though a more recent development in 
international law and IEL than intergenerational equity, the precautionary principle has 
also come to take on an important role in the field with its emphasis on environmental 
protection and its relation to scientific uncertainty. The precautionary principle is also 
often considered part of, or an essential feature of, sustainable development.
430
 
            This chapter explores the emergence and development of the precautionary 
principle in international law. It examines its definition and two key components: threat 
of harm and scientific uncertainty. It also discusses the burden of proof that applies to the 
principle and its current legal status in international law. It then considers the principle’s 
links to human health by considering the links between health and environment. Finally, 
the concept of precaution under the principle is compared to that in international 
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humanitarian law. Ultimately, this chapter aims to provide the necessary understanding of 
the precautionary principle to be able to see how it can be applied in the context of 
military decision-making, which will be the focus of the final chapter of this thesis. 
5.2 Emergence and Development of the Precautionary 
Principle in International Environmental Law 
            The precautionary principle began to emerge in IEL instruments in the mid-1980s, 
though earlier instances of the principle can be seen in national legal systems.
431
 In 
particular, some scholars suggest that the principle grew out of the similar concept of 
Vorsorgeprinzip in West Germany of the 1970s and 80s.
432
 Precautionary thinking, 
though not yet the precautionary principle, can be seen in international law prior to the 
1980s in instruments such as the 1972 World Heritage Convention
433
 and the 1973 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.
434
 
The 1982 UN World Charter for Nature articulated an early version of the precautionary 
principle, though, once again, it did not use the term itself. Articles 11(a) and (b) of the 
Charter stated, as follows: 
11.  Activities which might have an impact on nature shall be 
controlled, and the best available technologies that minimize 
significant risks to nature or other adverse effects shall be used; in 
particular: 
(a) Activities which are likely to cause irreversible 
damage to nature shall be avoided; 
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      (b) Activities which are likely to pose a significant risk to 
nature shall be preceded by an exhaustive examination; 
their proponents shall demonstrate that expected benefits 
outweigh potential damage to nature, and where potential 
adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities 
should not proceed […].
435
 
The concepts of ‘significant risk to nature’, ‘adverse effects’, and irreversibility would all 
come to be integral parts of the precautionary principle. 
            Meanwhile, the term ‘precaution’ or precautionary’ began appearing in 
instruments such as the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer.
436
 The preamble to this Convention contained the phrase, “Mindful also of the 
precautionary measures for the protection of the ozone layer which have already been 
taken at the national and international levels”.
437
 The 1987 Montreal Protocol to this 
Convention also referenced precaution.
438
 Also in 1987, the London Ministerial 
Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea 
made several references to “a more precautionary approach”, “the principle of 
precautionary action” and “the principle of precaution”, and state that “a precautionary 
approach is necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances even 
before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence”.
439
 
            With the 1990s came an ever-increasing reliance upon, or use of, the 
precautionary principle in international law. An important instrument in the trajectory of 
the precautionary principle was the 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable 
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Development in the Economic Commission for Europe Region.
440
 This was the first 
international instrument, albeit a non-binding one, which “treat[ed] the principle as one of 
general application and linked [to] sustainable development.”
441
 Paragraph seven of the 
Declaration stated:  
In order to achieve sustainable development, policies 
must be based on the Precautionary Principle. 
Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and 
attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack 
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason 
for postponing measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.
442
 
In 1992, the principle appeared in at least six international instruments, including the 
1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic,
443
 the 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment 
of the Baltic Sea,
444
 the 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of 
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Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes,
445
 the 1992 UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change,
446
 Agenda 21,
447
 and the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development.
448
 
            The articulation of the precautionary principle in Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration, though a non-binding instrument, has come to be a definition of great 
importance. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states: 
In order to protect the environment, the Precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by states according to 
their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.
449
 
This definition has since been said to reflect the core, or essence, of the principle.
450
 It is 
also said to be the “most cited and conclusive definition of the principle in effect at the 
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international level.”
451
 The importance of the Principle 15 definition is also emphasized 
by the fact that, “[s]ince the 1992 Rio Conference, [the precautionary principle] has been 
taken up in the majority of bilateral and multilateral international treaties relating to 
environmental protection.”
452
 
            The precautionary principle has continued to appear in numerous international 
instruments, both binding and non-binding, since 1992. In particular, it has appeared in 
treaties, agreements, and declarations focusing on water-related pollution,
453
 fisheries,
454
 
air pollution,
455
 and animal and biodiversity conservation.
456
 In all, since its emergence 
in the 1980s, the precautionary principle “within the space of a decade experienced a 
meteoric rise” and is now included in most environmental protection treaties.
457
 In total, 
there are “some 60 multilateral treaties, covering a wide array of environmental issues 
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ranging from air pollution to waste management”
458
 in existence currently, and this 
number seems likely to only continue rising. 
5.3 Defining the Precautionary Principle 
            The precautionary principle has rapidly emerged as an important principle of IEL, 
to the point where it is now widely used in international treaties and declarations. 
However, the principle is also often criticized for being “vague and undefined”.
459
 There 
are at least twelve different definitions of the principle in international instruments.
460
 
Nonetheless, these varying definitions tend to focus around certain essential elements of 
the principle and its objectives: ultimately, no matter how it is phrased, the precautionary 
principle seeks to protect the environment from serious damage, even where scientific 
uncertainty exists as to the causal link between the action and the damage. 
            The precautionary principle endeavors to respond to the lesson of history: “[t]oo 
often, our experience in matters relating to the environment indicates that when we are 
certain we are impotent – it is too late to repair the damage.”
461
 Therefore, rather than 
wait until there is scientific certainty and, most likely the damage has already occurred, 
the precautionary principle “assert[s] that potential long-term, adverse, unintended 
consequences should be considered in advance rather than addressed after the fact.”
462
 
This means acting in a precautionary manner under conditions of scientific uncertainty. It 
is for this reason that the principle is often associated with the adage ‘better safe than 
sorry’
463
 and scholars, such as Arie Trouwborst, note that the “principle is supposed to 
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ensure that erring, which after all is human, is done on the side of caution and not to the 
detriment of the environment.”
464
  
            In seeking to protect the environment from degradation at the hands of humans, 
several key elements of the principle can be isolated. Timothy O’Riordan and James 
Cameron, an environmental scientist and a lawyer respectively, identify six basic 
concepts they find in the precautionary principle: (1) preventative anticipation; (2) 
safeguarding of ecological space; (3) proportionality of response or cost-effectiveness of 
margins of error; (4) duty of care or onus of proof on those who propose change; (5) 
promoting the cause of intrinsic natural rights; and (6) paying for past ecological debt.
465
 
Though, having identified these concepts, O’Riordan and Cameron go on to state that 
“[b]y no means all of these interpretations are formally approved in international law and 
common practice.”
466
 Rather, in practice, they suggest, the principle boils down to 
“act[ing] prudently where there is sufficient scientific evidence and where action can be 
justified on reasonable judgments of cost effectiveness and where inaction could lead to 
potential irreversibility or demonstrate harm to the defenders and future generations.”
467
 
            Meanwhile Romeo Quijano, a medical doctor and toxicologist, identifies five 
essential elements to the precautionary principle: (1) prevention [of environmental harm]; 
(2) reverse onus [of proof]; (3) elimination [of harms/risks]; (4) community orientation 
[right to health and healthy environment trumps economic and property rights]; and (5) 
uncertainty is a threat.
468
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            Per Sandin, a philosopher specializing in bioethics and environmental ethics, 
speaks of four dimensions to the precautionary principle: “(1) the threat dimension 
concerns the possible threat, (2) the uncertainty dimension concerns the limits of 
knowledge, (3) the action dimension concerns the response to the threat, and (4) the 
command dimension concerns the way in which the action is prescribed.”
469
 He suggests 
that, “most formulations of the Precautionary Principle can be recast by inserting the 
formulations expressing the four dimensions into the following if-clause: If there is (1) a 
threat, which is (2) uncertain, then (3) some kind of action (4) is mandatory.”
470
 
            Finally, Trouwborst, a legal scholar, limits himself to identifying three common 
elements to definitions of the precautionary principle: “(1) threat of harm, (2) uncertainty, 
and (3) action.” He also suggests a basic definition which encompasses these key 
components common among the many varying definitions of the precautionary principle 
in existence. That basic definition is expressed as follows: 
Wherever, on the basis of the best information available, 
there are reasonable grounds for concern that serious 
and/or irreversible harm to the environment may occur, 
effective and proportional action to prevent and/or abate 
this harm must be taken, including in situations of 
scientific uncertainty regarding the cause, extent and/or 
probability of the potential harm.
471
 
            Common to these different articulations and classifications of key elements of the 
precautionary principle are a threat of harm to the environment and related uncertainty. 
These are very much the key components of the principle and will be discussed in greater 
detail below. First, however, an important note must be made with regards to the 
terminology used in labeling the principle. Some instruments will refer to it as the 
“precautionary principle”, while others use the term “precautionary approach”. 
According to some scholars, a ‘precautionary approach’ is softer and less legalistic than a 
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‘precautionary principle’.
472
 This is a view in which ‘precautionary approach’ is seen as 
not legally binding, as compared to a legal principle.
473
 There seems to be a geographic 
preference between the labels, with the European Community being more closely 
associated with the term ‘precautionary principle’, while the United States seems to have 
a preference for the term ‘precautionary approach’.
474
 Ultimately, it seems the difference 
is no more than a “semantic squabble”, with numerous scholars and international 
instruments seeming to use the terms interchangeably.
475
 Trouwborst notes that, in 
practice, “the only real difference seems to be the terminological distinction itself.”
476
 
The 1995 Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
from Land-Based Activities uses both terms at various points in its text,
477
 while Principle 
15 of the Rio Declaration uses ‘precautionary approach’, yet the Programme for Further 
Implementation of Agenda 21, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1997, in referring 
to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration refers to the ‘precautionary principle’.
478
 There 
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seems to be no tangible differences in reality between ‘precautionary approach’ and 
‘precautionary principle’.
479
 
5.4 Threat of Harm 
            The threat of harm to the environment, as seen in the different components listed 
above, is without doubt one of the key elements of the precautionary principle. A threat 
of harm to the environment is what triggers the need for the precautionary principle in the 
first place or, as Rajendra Ramlogan notes, “the presence of a threat of serious or 
irreversible harm is a condition precedent for the application of the precautionary 
principle.”
480
 Given the pivotal role threat of harm plays in the operation and application 
of the principle, it is essential to have a better understanding of what is meant by this 
term. In the context of the precautionary principle, the term ‘threat of harm’ is often 
found, as well as other variations such as ‘damage’ or ‘environmental degradation’ or 
‘adverse impact’.
481
 These different words and phrases seem to be used interchangeably 
to represent the threat which triggers the precautionary principle. 
            Since all interactions with the environment produce some sort of effect or 
potential change on the environment, it is important to distinguish between acceptable 
and unacceptable environmental change. According to Trouwborst, “[e]nvironmental 
change […] qualifies as harm only when it is negative”, which, in the context of the 
precautionary principle, includes “the impairment of values of nature to humans and the 
impairment of the intrinsic value of nature”.
482
  Furthermore, generally only 
anthropogenic - that is, human-caused or -produced, threats  - are considered.
483
 Modern 
examples include deforestation, air pollution, and hunting species to the point of 
extinction. 
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            Since most human activity tends to have impacts on the environment, the 
precautionary principle tends to include a threshold for identifying which threats, meeting 
or surpassing the threshold, merit the application of the principle and which threats do not 
meet the threshold and therefore do not warrant precautionary action.
484
 The 
environmental harm that the precautionary principle seeks to avoid “is not minor or 
trivial, but tangible, appreciable and measurable.”
485
 The threshold terms frequently used 
in the precautionary principle are ‘serious or irreversible damage’
486
 as referred to in 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.  
            Two key indicators of the seriousness of harm are geographic dispersion, that is, 
how large an area the harm is going to affect, and the duration or persistence of the harm 
over time:
487
 the inference is that the larger the area affected and the more long-term or 
persistent the harm, the more serious the harm. The fact that the harm is also irreversible 
will also add to its seriousness, “since irreversible damage is by definition serious.”
488
  
However, while irreversibility of harm bolsters a finding of seriousness, serious harm is 
not always irreversible.
489
 For example, the damage from oil spills at sea is largely 
reversible, but oil spills nonetheless “fall within the scope of the precautionary principle 
owing to their seriousness.”
490
 Meanwhile, irreversibility is still an indication of the 
gravity of the potential harm, as well as incorporating a specific temporal element into 
the harm threshold.
491
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            Finally, for the threat of environmental harm to trigger the precautionary principle 
there must be “some indication, some hint, some concrete information suggesting that 
harm may occur.”
492
 It is not sufficient that there be merely a “theoretical possibility of 
environmental damage”.
493
 Despite this, it is also not required that the harm be a 
scientific certitude either, since scientific uncertainty is the second key trigger for 
precautionary action. It is simply that there must be “at least a minimal requirement of 
proof” otherwise “the remotest possibilities would be eligible as a basis for precautionary 
action.”
494
 From this point, the question then becomes a threshold question, not about the 
threat of harm, but about the degree of scientific uncertainty which triggers the 
precautionary principle. 
5.5 Uncertainty and Risk 
            The sheer complexity of the environment, its many elements, many ecosystems, 
and the interconnectedness of them all, makes scientific certainty in the environmental 
realm a challenge, to say the least. Isolating causes and effects becomes difficult and this 
difficulty is only increased when effects may not be fully known or realized in the short-
term. Current advances in “scientific methods of risk identification and prediction have 
uncovered more subtly related causes and effects that unfold over longer latency periods, 
thereby calling for ever-earlier actions to anticipate uncertain future effects and to 
manage suspected present causes.”
495
 To understand scientific uncertainty in the context 
of the precautionary principle, it is crucial to first understand uncertainty and risk in 
science.  
            Certainty and uncertainty have slightly different meanings in the scientific context 
than they do in ordinary day-to-day life. In science, “certainty is generally considered to 
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lie in the realm of 95%”
496
 and not 100%, since 100% certainty is deemed virtually 
impossible. A scientist will find something certain if the probability of occurrence or 
accuracy of the finding is 95% or higher. Therefore, uncertainty in the scientific 
community exists between 0 and 95 percent.
497
 In terms of risks, there are certain risks 
and uncertain risks. Certain risks are those where there is scientific certainty as to the link 
between cause and effect, while uncertain risks are those for which the “occurrence of 
such risks remains controversial at a scientific level, but it is not unreasonable to 
anticipate their occurrence on the basis of certain data, even if those data have not yet 
been fully validated.”
498
 Uncertainty here is “a situation in which the hazard and harm is 
known, but it is impossible to assign probabilities to its realisation.”
499
 Uncertain risks 
are the focus of the precautionary principle, whereas certain risks, since they are known, 
fall under a principle of prevention.
500
 For example, the risks of cancer from smoking are 
well established in science. Therefore there are certain or known risks, as well as 
preventative measures to prevent people acquiring cancer from smoking, such as warning 
labels on packaging. In contrast, where scientific knowledge is less firmly established, 
accepted risks will be uncertain and measures to prevent such risks will be precautionary. 
For example, if only a single scientific study suggests eating broccoli causes cancer this 
finding of risk is uncertain and taking measures to prevent this risk, such as refraining 
from eating broccoli, would constitute precautionary measures. 
            Uncertainty, meanwhile, has a variety of sources. Uncertainty can stem from a 
complete or partial lack of data.
501
 This is “[t]raditionally the most common form of 
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uncertainty” and is labeled ‘ignorance’.
502
 Uncertainties may also stem from the 
“imperfection of models in making predictions” or the method of research, such as 
scientific results gathered in a controlled lab versus the uncontrolled real world.
503
 
Finally, uncertainty may be the result of indeterminacy.
504
 This source of uncertainty 
“means that the systems being studied operate to processes that cannot be encapsulated in 
traditional scientific terms.”
505
 In other words, it “refers to the layer of complexity and 
unpredictability added when biological systems function in the world of human 
agency.”
506
 
            As science and technology continue to progress, it is possible for new knowledge 
and capabilities to resolve past uncertainties, thereby initiating a shift from precautionary 
to preventive measures.
507
 In the meantime, scientific uncertainty, when combined with a 
‘serious or irreversible’ threat to the environment, will trigger the precautionary principle. 
The threshold terminology generally associated with scientific uncertainty in the 
precautionary principle is ‘reasonable grounds for concern’.
508
 This refers to the 
likelihood of the threat occurring or “how (scientifically) plausible a threat must be to 
trigger precaution.”
509
 If there are reasonable grounds for believing the threat may 
materialize, then precautionary action is required. It is suggested that this threshold falls 
“somewhere between the possibility and the probability of harm coming about.”
510
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            Finally, there are two cautions that must be expressed when dealing with 
scientific uncertainty and the precautionary principle. First, decision-makers must be 
aware of, and give due consideration to, “countervailing risks that are created by 
precautionary actions.”
511
 Since most actions present a consequence, whether negative or 
positive, for the environment, options for action must not be considered so narrowly as to 
ignore potentially greater risks in the course of action chosen to address the initial threat 
which triggered the precautionary principle.
512
 Second, it is important to recognize when 
scientific certainty is falsely manufactured through statistics.
513
 Despite these cautions, 
however, the precautionary principle is a necessary part of IEL and environmental 
protection because an ounce of precaution is better than no precaution at all. 
5.6 The Burden of Proof 
            No understanding of the precautionary principle would be complete without an 
examination of the burden of proof that attaches to the principle. In the context of the 
precautionary principle, the burden of proof is often described as a ‘reverse onus’ or a 
‘shifting burden of proof’.
514
 Traditionally, the burden of proof lies with the opponent of 
the proposed activity, who must provide sufficient evidence of guilt or harm or risk of 
harm, depending on the context and standard of proof in question.
515
 In criminal justice, 
the accused is innocent until proven guilty and has no obligation to provide evidence 
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against him/herself.
516
 Even in the environmental context, “[t]raditional legal standards 
[…] have tended to privilege parties accused of degrading the environment; until ‘proven 
wrong’ such parties can continue the activity in question.”
517
  
            In contrast, under the precautionary principle, the burden is shifted to the 
proponent of action, thereby “placing the burdens and responsibilities for safety and 
understanding on producers and not putting the burden of proof of harm on the potential 
victims.”
518
 In doing so, the burden shifts to “the party or entity that will benefit from the 
activity” and, even more importantly, “on the party best able to generate the information 
needed to make the decision.”
519
 The burden lies with the entity looking to change the 
status quo, wherein the status quo is the current less polluted world prior to the 
introduction of the newly proposed risks.
520
 
            Such a shift in the burden of proof would seem very appropriate, perhaps even a 
matter of common sense, in situations where the precautionary principle is in operation. 
First, the environment and individuals likely to be the victims should the potential harms 
be realized are rarely in the position to mount an objection prior to the risky activities 
having taken place. They may lack knowledge about the existence of the proposed 
activity, or, if known, they may lack access to information necessary to mount an 
opposition, and quite often they will lack the resources to challenge the actions in court 
prior to the harms having occurred. As such, the precautionary principle “calls for 
assigning appropriate burdens” which demands a shift since the “aim is fairness and 
accountability” for all parties involved.
521
 Furthermore, the shifting burden is arguably 
necessary to align with the objectives and intentions of the precautionary principle which 
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“posits a presumption in favour of protection of the environment and public health.”
522
 
Trouwborst equates the presumption of innocence in criminal law with a presumption of 
harmfulness under the precautionary principle.
523
 Therefore, where threat of harm and 
scientific uncertainty have triggered the precautionary principle, the maxim should be 
‘harmful until proven harmless’.
524
 
            This shifting burden is not only the product of academic discourse, but appears in 
numerous international instruments which include the precautionary principle. The 1998 
Wingspread Statement, produced by academics at the Wingspread Conference on the 
Precautionary Principle, stated that, under the precautionary principle, “the proponent of 
an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof.”
525
 Other 
international instruments that have included a precautionary burden of proof include the 
1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities,
526
 the 1991 
Antarctic Protocol,
527
 the 2002 Guiding Principles on Invasive Alien Species,
528
 and the 
1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic.
529
 Evidence suggest that, in practice, states often apply this shifted burden, but 
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even more frequently states have used and created definitions of the precautionary 
principle which are silent with regard to the burden of proof to be applied.
530
 In such 
cases, it is unclear whether the traditional burden of proof is automatic and assumed. A 
strong argument for the precautionary style burden’s logic and trueness to the objectives 
and aims of the principle itself can be made to suggest it is inherent in the invocation of 
the principle even where it is not explicitly stated.
531
 
5.7 The Legal Status of the Precautionary Principle 
            Despite its meteoric rise and widespread inclusion in international and domestic 
legal instruments, the legal status of the precautionary principle is still subject to debate. 
The question is whether the precautionary principle is a legal principle, a general 
principle of international law, a customary international law norm, or, perhaps, all three. 
Those who deny that the principle has achieved any of these statuses primarily attribute it 
to the fact that the principle is subject to so many varying interpretations, that there are 
“no clear rules of application”, and that it is “ambiguous and undefined”.
532
 In contrast, 
proponents of the principle note that the more general nature of the principle is essential 
because in order “to be effective it must be general in character but capable of devolving 
to the particular”.
533
 In practice, the principle has demonstrated this capacity through its 
application to both specific areas of IEL, such as ozone depletion, as well as to more 
general concepts, as in the case of environmental protection and development.
534
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Furthermore, they note that it is “characteristic of general principles with a wide scope of 
application […to have] various elements […] open to interpretation”.
535
 
            That the precautionary principle is a general principle of international law is 
broadly embraced in academic discourse.
536
 It has “received widespread support by the 
international community”
537
 and also forms “an essential part of all municipal (domestic) 
systems for protecting health, safety and the environment.”
538
 Cameron notes that “[i]t 
has also achieved near universal recognition as a fundamental element in the creation of 
new environmental policy instruments”
539
 which suggests that the principle’s acceptance 
is continuing to increase. In her work, Ramlogan provides an overview of some countries 
which have embraced and/or applied the precautionary principle in either national 
legislation and/or national courts.
540
 These countries include Pakistan,
541
 Australia,
542
 
India,
543
 Canada,
544
 Kenya,
545
 and Trinidad and Tobago.
546
 It appears there is a great 
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deal of evidence to support not only widespread practice by many states, but also 
recognition by many national courts that the precautionary principle has achieved 
international legal status. 
           In addition, there is confirmation that the precautionary principle is not only a 
general principle of international law, but that it has also attained customary status.
547
  
The widespread international and domestic support equally bolsters the conclusion that it 
has reached customary law status and general principle status. Furthermore, Trouwborst 
states that, “there is a core content of the precautionary principle on which there is 
apparent agreement among states”.
548
 This core content of the customary precautionary 
principle includes the risk of “serious and/or irreversible harm to the environment” and 
“scientific uncertainty regarding the cause, extent and/or probability of the potential 
harm”, followed by the requirement to take “effective and proportional action to abate 
this harm  
            The decisions of international courts and tribunals have done little to clarify the 
legal status of the precautionary principle. International case law has yet to fully embrace, 
or alternatively denounce, the precautionary principle. It has been raised before different 
courts and tribunals and, more often than not, they have refrained from addressing the 
subject. New Zealand raised the precautionary principle before the ICJ in the Nuclear 
Test case.
549
 Though the ICJ did not address it in its judgment, Ad Hoc Judge Palmer and 
Judge Weeramentry each addressed the principle in their dissenting opinions. Ad Hoc 
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Judge Palmer stated that the “precautionary principles ha[d] developed rapidly and 
m[ight] now be a principle of customary international law relating to the 
environment”,
550
 while Judge Weeramantry’s remarks acknowledged the shifted burden 
that exists under the precautionary principle and said the principle “was gaining 
increasing support as part of the international law of the environment”.
551
 The 
precautionary principle was raised again by Hungary in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case 
and, once again, the ICJ chose not to address it in its judgment.
552
 In the 2010 Pulp Mills 
case before the ICJ, both parties - Argentina and Uruguay - discussed the precautionary 
principle in their submissions, but the majority judgment did not deal with the principle, 
other than to say it did not accept that it “operates as a reversal of the burden of proof”.
553
 
Judge Trinidade, in his separate opinion, discussed the precautionary principle at length. 
On the failure of his colleagues to address the precautionary principle in their judgment, 
he stated: “It escapes my comprehension why the ICJ has so far had so much precaution 
with the precautionary principle.”
554
 He noted that both parties to the dispute seemed to 
have accepted the principle and only disagreed over whether it applied in the particular 
circumstances of the case.
555
 Finally, he noted that “[t]he fact that the Court’s Judgment 
silenced on them does not mean that the principles of prevention and of precaution do not 
exist. They do exist and apply, and are […] of the utmost importance as part of the jus 
necessarium. We can hardly speak of International Environmental Law nowadays 
without those general principles.”
556
 
            Elsewhere, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has showed a 
willingness to both discuss and embrace the precautionary principle. In its Advisory 
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Opinion on the Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and 
Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, it noted the increasing use of the principle 
in international instruments and expressed the opinion that this had “initiated a trend 
towards making this approach part of customary international law.”
557
 
            Ultimately, despite unclear articulation and application by international courts, 
there appears to be strong support for concluding that the precautionary principle is both 
a general principle of international law and customary law. 
5.8 Health and the Precautionary Principle 
            The legal status debate also includes debate over whether a customary 
precautionary principle is limited to environmental protection or whether it also 
encompasses precaution towards risks to human health. Human health is often reliant on 
a healthy environment. Environmental degradation in the form of air pollution, water 
contamination, or health risks entering the food chain can have negative effects on human 
health.  
            Many scholars include risks to health as part of the precautionary principle. It is 
one part of a broader definition of ‘environment’, such as was used in the 2005 Iron 
Rhine case decided by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The court defined 
‘environment’ as including “air, water, land, flora and fauna, natural ecosystems and 
sites, human health and safety, and climate.”
558
 Furthermore, it is very difficult to 
separate one from the other since a healthy environment promotes good human health 
and, even more so, an unhealthy environment is likely to have negative health impacts on 
individuals.
559
 In spite of this, Trouwborst suggests that the customary legal definition of 
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the precautionary principle does not include “health protection in its own right” within its 
scope.
560
 However, human health “may be deemed as included within [the principle’s 
scope] as far as its protection from adverse environmental impacts is concerned.”
561
 That 
is, while he suggests that health issues such as food safety may not fall under the 
customary principle,
562
 health risks from water contaminants or air pollution would fall 
within its purview. Conversely, other scholars take the inclusion of health protection as 
an inherent part of the precautionary principle.
563
  
            It is difficult to separate many environmental threats from the consequent threats 
they pose to human health. Oftentimes, the threat to human health can be an important 
factor in the assessment of the severity of the threat of harm under the precautionary 
principle. This link between the environment and health is often even more evident in 
conflict zones where many weapons simultaneously threaten both the environment and 
human health. This link and the consideration of threats to human health under the 
precautionary principle will become more evident and more important in the following 
chapter of this thesis. Before we can begin to bring together the principles of IEL with the 
protections of IHL, there are two concepts which appear in both fields that must be 
examined to understand their similarities and differences. 
5.9 Precaution and Proportion: The Precautionary Principle 
versus International Humanitarian Law 
            Proportionality arises under the precautionary principle when considering the 
course of action for addressing the threat of harm that has arisen.
564
 Under the 
precautionary principle, proportionality seeks to ensure that responses to threats of harm 
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“correspond to the perceived dimensions of the risk involved.”
565
 In other words, “[t]he 
more significant or the more serious the expected environmental impact, the more 
rigorous preventive or abatement measures may, respectively must be.”
566
 Should there 
be more than one option available and uncertainty or doubt as to which should be chosen, 
in keeping with the precautionary principle the option which errs on the side of protecting 
the environment should be selected.
567
 
            The concepts of precaution and proportionality are also, as discussed earlier, part 
of IHL. Under IHL proportionality is the “requirement to select the method or means of 
attack likely to cause the least collateral damage or incidental injury, all other things 
being equal, relative to the military advantage obtained.”
568
 Even though the 
terminology, of precaution and proportionality, is similar or the same in both IEL and 
IHL, the definitions and applications vary. Proportionality under the precautionary 
principle is similar to proportionality under IHL in that it serves to “[adjust] the means to 
the objective” and demands that “a course of action is chosen that corresponds to the size 
of the risk involved.”
569
 Where it differs is in the objective that is sought. Under the 
precautionary principle, actors are seeking to balance the desired action, development, 
with environmental protection. In this balancing and weighing process “the precautionary 
principle posits a presumption in favour of protection of the environment and public 
health.”
570
 In IHL, the consideration of proportionality results in weighing and balancing 
military necessity with humanity. Generally, the benefit of the doubt is given to the 
military actors.
571
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            Precaution also differs in its precise meaning between the precautionary principle 
and IHL. While precaution under IHL without question “constitute[s] obligatory 
standards of conduct”
572
 and is enshrined in customary international law,
573
 as we have 
seen, the precautionary principle, though likely the same, it is not quite so firmly as 
established as in IHL. Yet it would appear that precaution under IHL “remains relatively 
abstract”,
574
 perhaps even more so than under the precautionary principle. Whereas the 
precautionary principle includes thresholds such as ‘serious or irreversible harm’ and 
‘reasonable grounds for concern’, precaution in IHL is merely phrased as ‘all feasible 
precautions’ and left at that. This is worrisome because it largely leaves it to the military 
decision-maker to determine what the requirements for fulfilling this duty will be. It fails 
to provide a yardstick by which to gauge whether the duty has been fulfilled.  
            Whereas scientific uncertainty triggers the precautionary principle, the duty to 
take precautions in IHL flows from the principle of distinction. Outside the language of 
the duty, there is more discussion such that the duty of precaution in IHL can be said to 
include things such as a “duty to verify the nature of the target”,
575
 an “obligation to 
choose the military objective that involves the least danger to civilian lives and civilian 
objects”
576
 and an “obligation to give advance warning of an attack that may affect the 
civilian population”.
577
 Even so, even the latter obligation on giving warnings is not 
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absolute. Since “surprise has become a primordial condition for success”,
578
 if 
precautions are taken, it can be asked whether ‘all feasible precautions’ are actually 
taken. So, while precaution seems to demand certain outcomes (warnings, timing of 
attacks, weapon selection), some question “whether, and to what extent, [precaution in 
IHL] can be interpreted as legitimizing mistakes.”
579
 The nature of the obligations said to 
flow from precaution in IHL would seem to suggest it has more of a preventive than 
precautionary nature, as precautionary is understood in the IEL context, since the IHL 
precaution provisions appear to target common-sense risks to civilians which do not 
attract a high degree of uncertainty. Examples might include, for instance, providing a 
warning in advance to clear an area of civilians or attacking at night when fewer civilians 
are out or in the area. If civilians are unaware of a pending attack they cannot take 
measures to protect themselves. Likewise, if an attack is conducted during the day there 
are likely to be more civilians in the streets, in office buildings, etc.. Issuing a warning 
and/or attacking at night would simply seem to be common sense preventive measures, 
rather than precautionary in the sense of the precautionary principle. 
            Meanwhile, the precautionary principle has thresholds which trigger action and is 
closely linked to science even if uncertainty plays a large role. Fundamentally, where 
precaution in IHL seems to demand certain actions/outcomes, “[a] fundamental feature of 
the precautionary principle is that it is not concerned with guaranteeing particular 
outcome, but rather with the process by which a decision is made.”
580
 Finally, the 
precautionary principle prioritizes the protection of the environment above all else, with 
human health perhaps only an indirect beneficiary of this stringent protection. In contrast, 
precaution in IHL focuses primarily on avoiding harm to civilian lives and civilian 
objects. 
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            While precaution and proportionality in IHL and under the precautionary 
principle both seek to protect entities from damage, under the precautionary principle 
they appear to provide better protection. Both seek to balance the size of the threat with 
the response to the harm, but under IHL the benefit of the doubt is often given to the 
military actor carrying out the risky activity. Meanwhile, under the precautionary 
principle the benefit of the doubt lies in favor of protecting the environment. 
Furthermore, the precautionary principle provides more substantive content and 
guidelines for assessing precaution (threat of serious or irreversible harm and scientific 
uncertainty) while under IHL a general and vague duty to take ‘all feasible precautions’ is 
given with little guidance as to the content of that duty. The precautionary principle 
provides more detailed and more protective standards than precaution and proportionality 
under IHL. 
5.10 Conclusion 
            This chapter has explored the precautionary principle within international 
environmental law. Following the rapid development of the principle it has examined its 
definition and key components of threat of harm, scientific uncertainty and shifted burden 
of proof. It has also examined its legal status which suggests that it is both a general 
principle of international law and, quite possibly, a principle of customary international 
environmental law as well. The important link between the protection of health and the 
environment under the precautionary principle was also examined. Finally, the concepts 
of precaution and proportionality in international humanitarian law and under the 
precautionary principle were discussed and compared. 
            While some debate may exist as to the definition and legal status of the 
precautionary principle, it is apparent that key elements may be drawn from it, namely, 
the threat of harm and scientific uncertainty. These two elements act as triggers for the 
principle, calling it into action to ensure decision-making processes are used which 
prioritize environmental protection in the face of these threats and uncertainties. It is also 
clear that the precautionary principle has become a common inclusion in environmental 
legal and policy instruments, both general and specific. Not only has the principle taken 
on a key role internationally, it has been embraced domestically by states around the 
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world.  It would appear that the precautionary principle is most certainly a general 
principle of international law, and likely also a part of customary international law. 
            This thesis has explored both intergenerational equity and the precautionary 
principle, in addition to general principles of international law and the protection of 
civilians and the environment in IHL. All of these elements fit together. Both 
intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle have been shown to be general 
principles of international law. The detailed examination of the functions of general 
principles in Chapter three, therefore, provides guidance on how intergenerational equity 
and the precautionary principle can be used to unify, fill gaps, interpret and develop 
international law, including international humanitarian law. The next chapter will 
therefore explore how intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle could be 
applied in military decision-making so as to limit instances in which civilian and 
environmental casualties can be justified within the context of international humanitarian 
law. 
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Chapter 6  
6 Application of IEL Principles to Military Decision-Making 
6.1 Introduction 
            The previous chapters have explored the main components of this thesis: (1) the 
current status of IHL protections for civilians and the environment; (2) the status and role 
of general principles of international law; (3) IEL, sustainable development, and the 
principle of intergenerational equity; and (4) the precautionary principle in IEL. This 
chapter will establish how these components can work together in military decision-
making to provide more clarity and ensure that existing legal protections for civilians and 
the environment are better respected in practice. 
            To demonstrate this, the chapter will begin with a look at the question of how IEL 
- whether treaty provisions, principles or customary laws – can apply during armed 
conflict. It will then turn to the examples discussed in chapter two: the use of cluster 
munitions by NATO in Kosovo in 1999 and the use of depleted uranium weapons by 
Coalition forces in Iraq in 2003. While reference will be made to how these examples 
fare under the specific environmental provisions of Additional Protocol I, the focus will 
be on how considerations of intergenerational equity and precaution can improve 
protection in conducting proportionality assessments for military action under the 
traditional principles and provisions relating to the protection of civilians and objects. 
6.2 The Application of International Environmental Law in 
Armed Conflicts 
            It is a truth universally acknowledged that armed conflict causes the destruction 
and degradation of the environment, not merely during conflict but continuing even once 
a conflict has ended.
581
 This damage is not only direct, such as the defoliation of forests 
in Vietnam, but also indirect, such as when unexploded ordnance make arable lands 
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unusable, thereby endangering not only the environment, but also “people’s health, 
livelihoods, and security.”582 As concern for the protection of the environment in general 
has increased, scholars such as Richard Tarasofsky have questioned “whether a new 
customary principle has now emerged which directly protects the environment.”583 In 
fact, the International Law Commission’s [ILC] Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind indicates that such a customary rule has emerged to protect the 
environment from ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ damage.584 However, the actual 
practice of States does not clearly support such a finding.
585
 Even so, the protection of the 
environment has clearly taken on a great importance in international law and international 
law has recognized and begun to attempt to address the links between the environment 
and armed conflict.
586
 
            The question then becomes what, if any, effect the rules and principles of IEL 
have on the rules, principles and application of IHL. The traditional view was that 
treaties, and law outside IHL, did not survive the outbreak of war.
587
 Instead, IHL was 
seen as lex specialis, taking priority over all other laws between belligerents.
588
 The more 
modern view now sees conflict as “a continuation of interstate relation[s] and, thus, 
subject to legal limits”.589 In other words, IHL is not seen as displacing other forms of 
international law. Rather, it complements them and brings greater specificity to their 
applicability in conflict. In the context of the interplay of IHL and IEL, “when an attack 
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is launched, environmental considerations must play a role in the targeting process.”590 
This is supported by several international groups of experts. The Conference of Experts 
on the Use of the Environment as a Tool of Conventional Warfare held in Ottawa in 1991 
expressed the opinion that rules of general or ‘peacetime’ international law protecting the 
environment would normally remain applicable in armed conflict.
591
 A conference 
convened in Munich later that same year by the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources and the International Council of Environmental Law 
affirmed the views of the experts at the Ottawa Conference and asserted that “creating 
distinctions between damage to the environment during peacetime and wartime is 
artificial.”592 Finally, in 2001, the ILC released its report on the Effects of Armed 
Conflicts on Treaties, in which it stated that the outbreak of conflict does not necessarily 
terminate or suspend the operation of treaties.
593
 Rather, whether a treaty remains 
operative or is suspended or terminated depends on several considerations: “express 
provisions and subject matter of the treaty, treaty interpretation according to Articles 31 
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties […], the nature and extent of the 
armed conflict, and the effect of the armed conflict on the [subject matter or object of the] 
treaty.”594 
            These comments on the continuing effect of IEL treaties in armed conflict apply 
equally to customary rules of IEL.
595
 Furthermore, even soft law instruments which may 
not have yet achieved customary law status “may still inform the interpretation and 
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application of international law”596 during armed conflicts. For example, Principle 24 of 
the Rio Declaration states: 
Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. 
States shall therefore respect international law providing 
protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and 
cooperate in its further development, as necessary.
597
 
This could be interpreted in two different ways: (1) as a statement that IEL continues to 
apply in armed conflict or, alternatively, (2) an emphasis on the need for states to adhere 
to existing IHL protections for the environment.
598
 Either way, this Principle speaks to a 
clear intention that caution must be taken in armed conflict to protect the environment.
599
 
            The Martens Clause is also often cited in support of the continued operation of 
IEL rules, principles and custom during armed conflict. As explained in chapter two, the 
Martens Clause embraces the ‘laws of humanity’ and ‘requirements of public conscience’ 
as IHL continues to develop.
600
 Both are clearly capable, and indeed should, encompass 
the protection of the environment in modern conflict scenarios.
601
 
            The ILC Study Group’s “Fragmentation of International Law”602 report also 
provides solid guidance as to the operation, or co-operation, between different bodies of 
international law. The study notes that characterizations such as ‘trade law’ or 
‘environmental law’ “have no normative value per se” because they are merely “informal 
labels that describe the instruments from the perspective of different interests”.603 They 
discuss at length the principle of lex specialis derogat lex generalis, which means that the 
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more specific law overrides the more general law. It is the doctrine traditionally used to 
resolve conflicts between norms. It also applies in a scenario “where the specific rule 
should be read and understood within the confines or against the background of the 
general standard, typically as an elaboration, updating or a technical specification of the 
latter.”604 In terms of the prior scenario, where it operates to make the more specific law 
apply in lieu of the more general, the ILC points to its earlier publication of the Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, wherein the ILC 
stated that “[f]or the lex specialis to apply it is not enough that the same subject matter is 
dealt with by two provisions; there must be some actual inconsistency between them, or 
else a discernible intention that one provision is to exclude the other.”605  
            The ILC Study Group also looked to the ICJ Advisory Opinion in Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion in 1996 [Nuclear Weapons], which 
dealt expressly with the operation of IHL and other bodies of law during armed conflict. 
In considering the legality of nuclear weapons, the ICJ considered both human rights law 
and IEL. The court stated that human rights law continued to apply during armed 
conflicts.
606
 It was only in determining the meaning of ‘arbitrariness’ in the context of  
‘arbitrary deprivation of life’ in Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,
607
 that IHL provided more specific guidance.
608
 Both bodies of law 
applied, and in applying them, the “more general rule remains in the background 
providing interpretive direction to the special one.”609 
            Similarly, in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the ICJ did not dismiss IEL 
in favour of IHL. Instead, the court stated that “existing international law relating to the 
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protection of the environment […] indicates important environmental factors that are to 
be properly taken into account in the context of the implementation of the principles and 
rules of law applicable in armed conflict.”610 While it does not trump a state’s right to 
self-defence, “[r]espect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing 
whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and 
proportionality.”611 The court’s opinion critically demonstrates that none of these bodies 
of law “enjoys intrinsic priority over the others”, rather “a justifiable decision would have 
to take all of these into account by articulating some systemic relationship between [the 
different bodies of law]”.612 As the ILC aptly notes in its Fragmentation Study, “no rule, 
treaty or custom, however special its subject-matter or limited the number of States 
concerned by it, applies in a vacuum.”613 Armed conflict represents an intersection 
between many areas of international law and, in particular, rules and customs of human 
rights law and the laws protecting the environment must play an important role in the 
application of IHL. 
6.3 Assessing Real-Life Scenarios in Light of a Systemic 
Relationship between IEL and IHL 
            As discussed in chapter two, the environment enjoys protection in IHL both 
directly, from articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I, as well as indirectly, under 
the many provisions for the protection of civilian objects in Additional Protocol I. 
Civilians also enjoy numerous protections from attack during armed conflict under 
Additional Protocol I. Many, if not all, of these protections for civilians, civilian objects 
and the environment are also found in customary international law. Despite these ample 
protections, there remain instances in conflicts where it is questionable whether the letter 
of the law is truly being adhered to. Such instances include, as described in chapter two, 
the NATO bombings in Kosovo and the use of depleted uranium weapons by Coalition 
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Forces in the 2003 Iraq War. This section will re-examine these examples under the 
specific environmental provisions of Additional Protocol I and, more importantly, under 
a proportionality assessment incorporating the IEL principles of intergenerational equity 
and precaution. 
6.3.1 NATO bombings in Kosovo 
            Under Articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I, the threshold is set by the 
phrase ‘widespread, long-term and severe damage’. Such damage to the environment is 
prevented under IHL. Scholars note that this is, in fact, a rather high threshold to meet 
since the terms are cumulative, that is, all three (widespread, long-term and severe) must 
be met.
614
 In fact, Hulme goes so far as to state that “the [widespread, long-term and 
severe] threshold of harm is so high in practice that it would seem to make little 
difference.”615 Indeed, it appears that “negotiators assumed that, in practice, these 
provision would ‘not impose any significant limitation on combatants waging 
conventional warfare’.”616  
            In considering whether the use of cluster munitions by NATO in Kosovo meets 
the ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ threshold, considerations of principles of IEL do 
not have much relevance since it is not a balancing and weighing exercise, as seen with 
proportionality assessments, but rather a question of whether the threshold is met or 
not.
617
 Working backwards through the threshold,
618
 the definition for ‘severe’ entails 
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destruction or disturbance of the environment ‘in some large degree’, probably beyond 
the battlefield damage regularly caused in war”.619 This rather vague characterization of 
the term ‘severe’ leaves plenty of room to argue that many actions or weapon systems 
would fall in to this category. Some additional guidance on interpretation can perhaps be 
gleaned from the understanding of the term in the ENMOD Convention, in which 
‘severe’ is understood to involve “serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, 
natural and economic resources or other assets.”620 While still broadly defined, this 
definition provides a bit more detail on which to base a determination. Given that land 
polluted by unexploded cluster munitions is rendered unusable until the ordnance has 
properly and safely been removed, in addition to the severe health risk posed by 
unexploded ordnance, cluster munitions clearly pose a severe risk of damage to the 
environment. 
            Next is the question of whether the damage caused by the use cluster munitions is 
long-term or long-lasting. While the term is interpreted under ENMOD to mean “lasting 
for a period of months, or approximately a season”,621 indications are that, in Additional 
Protocol I, the drafters intended a stricter threshold for the term with a “scale of decades, 
twenty or thirty years as being a minimum”.622 Cluster munitions could meet either 
threshold. Unexploded ordnance creates damage that lasts until it is safely removed and 
disposed of or, in the worst-case scenario, until someone unknowingly triggers it and is 
wounded or killed by the resulting explosion. Unexploded cluster munitions, therefore, 
have the potential to cause damage that poses a permanent threat. 
            There is no definition for the final threshold term, widespread. The definition of 
the same term in ENMOD suggests “encompassing an area on the scale of several 
hundred square kilometres”.623 This could be the term upon which cluster munitions fail 
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the threshold test for Articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I. It depends on 
whether the damage is considered on the basis of a single attack with a small number of 
bombs or if damage is considered on the broader scale of an entire military campaign. 
Under the former, cluster munitions are unlikely to meet the threshold of widespread 
since the dispersal of bomblets generally covers an area of only 350 to 500 metres, with 
shrapnel travelling potentially a further 150 metres.
624
 Even when considered in the 
context of an entire military campaign, there is still potential that cluster munitions would 
fail to meet this part of the threshold. 
            Turning to a more traditional proportionality assessment, it is useful to examine 
the use of cluster munitions by NATO in the specific case of the intended attack on the 
airport in Niš, Serbia. In this instance, evidently technical errors led to the bombs being 
dropped on the market and hospital in lieu of the airport. This fact will play a role in the 
assessment of scientific uncertainty under the precautionary principle.  
            A first concern with cluster munitions are their indiscriminacy. This raises a red 
flag, since weapons of an indiscriminate nature are prohibited under the principle of 
distinction in IHL as well as in Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I. Articles 51(4)(b) 
and (c) state that indiscriminate attacks are  “those which employ a method or means of 
combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or […] those which 
employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required 
by this Protocol”.625 Once released, the bomblets cannot distinguish between combatants 
and non-combatants, or between civilian objects and military objects, nor can the 
shrapnel released when the individual bomblets explode. Furthermore, the unexploded 
bomblets are also incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military. Instead, they 
remain waiting for whomever or whatever - man, woman, child, farm stock, or wildlife - 
will be the unfortunate one to trigger it. That the effects are also indiscriminate towards 
the environment must be noted, but is, arguably, slightly less relevant. In terms of 
indiscriminacy, there is no weapon system that can discriminate between military 
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combatants or objects and the environment since the environment is present wherever a 
military object or combatants is located. As such, military necessity in terms of an 
assessment of discriminacy lessens the force of environmental protections. This is 
because any form of attack will be indiscriminate towards the environment, therefore, 
military necessity of being able to conduct operations necessitates indiscriminate action 
vis à vis the environment. 
            The next assessment is to examine the balancing of military necessity and 
humanity in the attack on the airport of Niš. This assessment demonstrates the true 
benefit and utility of incorporating principles of IEL into the decision-making process. 
The precautionary principle and the principle of intergenerational equity help provide 
greater definition to humanity protections for civilians and civilian objects, including the 
environment, in IHL. While the use of cluster munitions near population-dense areas was 
questioned at the time,
626
 these principles provide a more a more clear and defined 
criteria by which to evaluate the choices of military actors. The attack occurred in close 
proximity to urban areas, and the airport - a dual use object with both civilian and 
military purposes – was targeted with a weapon that could not discriminate between the 
two. These two facts cause concern since the military necessity applies only to the attack 
on the military objective, the airport, while weighing against it is the indiscriminate 
nature of the weapon and the threat it poses to a civilian object, the airport, civilians lives 
in proximity to that object, and the environment. The threat has the potential to be both 
severe and long-lasting. 
            Furthermore, serious questions of scientific uncertainty are raised by the use of 
cluster munitions both in terms of their threats of harm to the environment as well as to 
human health. The scientific uncertainty arises with the failure rate of the bomblets 
because of the numbers which fail to explode on initial impact and remain unexploded 
ordnance. The general failure rate provided by officials is about 5%, though this varies, 
and in Kosovo failure rates see estimate from 8-12% or even as high as 20%.
627
 Of 
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course, this is merely an average failure rate and “[t]o achieve that average rate of failure 
some dispensers will have failed totally, some will have had 50 per cent malfunctions, 
others 20 per cent and many will have had only one or two or no failed submunitions.”628 
What’s more, as McGrath notes, “it is the actual number of unexploded bomblets in a 
given situation that is of significance.”629 Some of the most conservative estimates state 
that approximately a minimum of 234,123 submunitions fell during the Kosovo 
Conflict.
630
 At a failure rate of 5%, that would still mean approximately 11,706 
unexploded bomblets lay over the former Yugoslavia by the conflict’s end. After the 
conflict, clearance survey reports indicated that approximately 54% of the contaminated 
lands were agricultural.
631
 Still, whether the agricultural lands of a community are 
covered by 500 or 50 unexploded bomblets will make little difference to the people who 
can no longer safely use those lands for their own food needs or as a source of income 
because they have no way of knowing how many unexploded bomblets cover their land 
or where exactly they lie.
632
 Therefore, there is uncertainty with cluster munitions with 
regards to where they will land, where their submunitions will land, whether their 
submunitions will detonate on impact, or how many will be left behind as unexploded 
ordnance. 
            The unexploded ordnance left behind pose a particular long-term threat to both 
the environment and human health. As noted, they make the land on which they lay 
unusable, essentially polluting it to the point where it can no longer safely be used. They 
pose an ongoing health risk to the civilian population since they could still explode if 
triggered by being picked up, kicked, or jostled. This risk can span generations, 
depending on the resources available for safe disposal units and the time it takes to safely 
clear a contaminated area.  
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            This demonstrates that cluster munitions, particular in populated areas, but even 
in agricultural rural areas, pose a significant threat to both civilians and civilian objects, 
including the environment. There is also significant scientific uncertainty surrounding 
where they will land and whether they will detonate or become unexploded ordnance. 
They also threaten to pose risks for long periods, possibly generations. These fulfill the 
guiding markers provided by the precautionary principle and doctrine of intergenerational 
equity, but the other side of the scale - military necessity - must also be considered. 
            As is often the case, states which use cluster munitions, including the U.S. and 
U.K. as prominent players in NATO’s Kosovo operations, emphasize the military utility 
of the weapon. They claim that cluster munitions possess “exceptional effectiveness 
against specific types of targets”.633 In fact, Moyes suggests, the data indicates that the 
utility seems to be more “in the wide range of targets against which they could plausibly 
be deployed.” In particular, they “were considered useful where vegetation cover 
obscured targets” which “suggests that cluster munitions were more a weapon of 
convenience than a specific tool for a specific job.”634 Furthermore, there was evidence 
from the use of cluster munitions during the 1991 Gulf War that soft ground was a major 
factor leading to failures to detonate, which makes the decision to “use […] cluster 
bombs against concealed targets in forested areas, despite evidence that a common 
weakness of the weapon is an inability to penetrate overgrowth without a high percentage 
of malfunctions”635 particularly confusing and raises questions about the thoroughness 
and, perhaps even good faith, put into the proportionality assessments for those 
operations. Finally the US Munitions Effects Assessment Team, who conducted an 
assessment in Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, “found that of 744 
‘confirmed’ NATO strikes, evidence could only be found of 58 successful strikes.”636 
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            Another argument military officials raise in support of their continuing use of 
cluster munitions is that all weapons have failure rates.
637
 Moyes provides three solid 
counterarguments to this assertion. First, he notes that the high number of bomblets “ 
radically alters the probability of unexploded items being produced.”638 An ordinary 
bomb will mean one unexploded item, while a single bomb containing 147 submunitions 
at a failure rate of 5%, means 7 unexploded ordnance. Second, with cluster munitions, the 
risk of civilian injury is increased because one large unexploded bomb is more noticeable 
and more easily avoided than many small unexploded and seemingly benign bomblets.
639
 
Finally, “[t]he failure rates of cluster munitions are likely to be higher than those of 
unitary munitions because the process of delivery involves more stages and at each of 
these stages failures can occur that result in unexploded ordnance.”640  
            Overall, it would seem that claims of the essential nature or military utility of 
cluster munitions are greatly over-exaggerated. Meanwhile, the threat to civilians and the 
environment is a real and substantial one. By applying the guidelines provided by the 
doctrine of intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle, it is clear that, 
whatever proportionality assessment was made in regard to this attack, it was inadequate. 
6.3.2 Depleted Uranium Weapons in the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 
Iraq War 
            Applying the ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ threshold in Articles 35(3) and 
55 of Additional Protocol I to depleted uranium weapons is more difficult than with 
cluster munitions because there is even greater uncertainty about the effects of the 
weapon on the environment. In terms of widespread damage, on impact a depleted 
uranium weapon produces an aerosolized toxic dust which can travel up to 400m from 
the impact site.
641
 Contamination from initial deployment, as well as produced by the 
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decay of the metal over time where it lands, could potentially spread up to 6km
642
 and 
risks leaching into not only the soil but the water table as well. Ultimately, as Wexler 
notes, “the widespread effects debate turns on the amount of [depleted uranium weapons] 
used in a given conflict and the ability of [depleted uranium] dust to travel through the 
air, water, and soil.”643 Based on this evidence, it seems questionable that depleted 
uranium weapons would be able to meet the widespread part of the threshold. 
            The long-term aspect of the threshold is more easily met for depleted uranium 
weapons. Depleted uranium weapons can “take several hundred years to fully corrode 
into the environment” and as such present a risk or threat of long-term damage to the 
environment.
644
 
            Finally, the assessment of whether the damage will be ‘severe’ is also a somewhat 
problematic one in this context. The worst-case scenarios presented by some scientists of 
polluted soils, water, flora and fauna, as well as the risks of cancer and other health 
problems to humans would certainly qualify as severe,
645
 but it is difficult to know how 
to weigh these when the scientific uncertainty is quite high. In such a case, the 
precautionary principle is useful: depleted uranium weapons do indeed represent a threat 
of severe damage because the degree of potential risk to health and the environment is so 
high and long-lasting that when erring on the side of caution we should assume the threat 
to be sufficiently severe so as to require precautionary measures. Ultimately, however, 
since the ‘widespread’ aspect of the threshold is still unmet, depleted uranium weapons 
would still fail the ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ threshold overall. 
            Turning to the proportionality assessment, once again it appears that it can 
provide greater protection for civilians and the environment than the specific 
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environmental provisions of IHL. Apart from the threats to the environment mentioned 
above posed by depleted uranium weapons there are significant potential threats to 
human health. If used near civilian populations, the risk of inhalation of the toxic dust 
from depleted uranium weapons may be high.
646
 There is also risk to anyone who may 
attempt to salvage from contaminated vehicles or to children who may play in the vicinity 
of these discarded materials.
647
 People risk exposure through the ingestions of foods 
grown in contaminated soil and by drinking water contaminated by corroding depleted 
uranium weapons leaching into the groundwater.
648
 The health concerns include cancer, 
birth defects and potential neurological disorders and other symptoms associated with the 
so-called ‘Gulf War Syndrome’. This latter syndrome plagues many veterans who have 
been exposed to depleted uranium weapons in conflicts.
649
  
            These all amount to a serious threat to both the environment and human health. 
There is also, as previously noted, significant scientific uncertainty regarding the effects 
of depleted uranium weapons. Furthermore, there is “much disagreement among 
scientists as to the exact effects of depleted uranium”.650 Proponents of depleted uranium 
weapons, such as Solis, rely on a report by the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) in 2000, which reported insignificant levels of depleted uranium at sites 
examined, as evidence that depleted uranium weapons are legal and in compliance with 
all IHL requirements.
651
 What Solis, and others, fail to note is that, in that same report, 
UNEP repeatedly mentions the scientific uncertainties regarding depleted uranium 
weapons and urges precaution and precautionary measures – essentially, they invoke the 
precautionary principle.
652
 The World Health Organization also indicates that 
contamination levels may rise over periods of years and, as such, sites must be monitored 
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over time and caution taken.
653
 The uncertainty is perhaps greater with regards to 
depleted uranium weapons than with cluster munitions, but the threat is nonetheless very 
serious with the potential to be quite long-lasting. As such, according to the guiding 
markers set out within intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle, this 
would suggest that depleted uranium weapons should not be used. 
            Still, we must consider this finding in light of the military necessity arguments on 
the other side.  One of the military benefits of depleted uranium is that it is “inexpensive 
and plentiful supplies are available.”654 Wexler notes four further strategic benefits of 
depleted uranium weapons: they “extend a tank’s effective firing range,” they “allow 
better tank penetration than traditional tungsten rounds do,” they “set hard targets on 
fire,” and “[depleted uranium] armored tanks are more difficult to penetrate than 
unarmored tanks.”655 Indeed, one of the most often cited benefits is that the high density 
of depleted uranium makes it good at penetrating armored vehicles
656
 and, one would 
assume, at preventing armored vehicles from being penetrated. There are, however, 
alternative weapons capable of providing the same results without the radioactivity of 
depleted uranium, such as tungsten, as Wexler notes, however, it is not as effective as 
depleted uranium.
657
 This would seem to also be scientifically uncertain, as the U.K.-
based International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons notes a British government study 
which found “a tungsten round combined with a German smoothbore barrel more 
effective than the current CHARM3 [depleted uranium] round”.658 A potentially, 
somewhat less effective weapon may be required to strike the necessary balance between 
military necessity and humanity. Still, the risks of the potential alternatives must also be 
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considered. Therefore, it must also be noted that tungsten itself, as a heavy metal, may, 
over time, present similar risks as depleted uranium weapons when it comes to water and 
food resources.
659
 Either way, these weapons mandate further research to better evaluate 
the risks they pose to people and the environment. As for the outcome of the 
proportionality assessment, since both weapons pose uncertain risks, ideally they should 
both be banned until their risks are better understood. However given that military 
necessity is also a weighty consideration, the tungsten rounds, which seem to pose ever 
so slightly less health risks, would be preferable to depleted uranium. 
6.4 Conclusion 
            Ultimately, it would seem that the traditional proportionality assessment applied 
in light of the relevant guiding principles of intergenerational equity and precaution 
provides a clearer guideline for evaluating military decision-making in armed conflict. 
The rigid and extremely high ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ threshold in the specific 
environmental provisions of Additional Protocol I makes them less sensitive to realities 
of environmental harms. There will always be a balancing of conflicting interests in 
armed conflict. Military necessity and humanity will forever be locked in a tug-of-war, 
but the intended protections are likely to be better respected if more clarity is provided in 
the considerations which must be evaluated in military decision-making. Providing 
guidelines such as protecting the planet from intergenerational harms and taking 
precautions to avoid irreversible damage even in the face of scientific uncertainty will 
allow individuals, civilians, NGOs, and other States to better understand, evaluate, and, if 
necessary, challenge the decision-making of armed forces in conflict. 
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Chapter 7  
7 Conclusion 
            This final chapter restates the research problem and summarizes the findings and 
approach proposed in the thesis. It also discusses some limitations of the work and 
suggests areas for further research. 
            This thesis set out to propose a way of improving the application of existing 
protections in IHL for civilians and the environment so that the intent and purpose of the 
formal protections will be better realized in practice. It identified a gap between theory 
and practice, that is, between the extensive formal protections for civilians and the 
environment in armed conflict and the realities in practice of harm and damage suffered 
by civilians and the environment during conflicts, often with ongoing and lasting effects 
after the conflict has ended. 
            These formal protections in IHL were examined in chapter one, where it was 
shown that the protection of civilians during armed conflict has a long history stretching 
back to the 19
th
 century. This history of IHL also includes the long-established 
restrictions on the methods and means of warfare available to combatants. It is firmly 
entrenched that the right to wage war is not unlimited, but rather carefully restricted. As 
environmental awareness grew in the 20
th
 century, IHL began to incorporate specific 
protections for the environment during conflict, though it is important to note that the 
environment also enjoys protection indirectly as a civilian object and therefore is also 
protected by requirements of proportionality. IHL is governed chiefly by efforts to 
balance military necessity and humanity, but the 1999 bombings in Kosovo by NATO 
and the use of depleted uranium weapons in Iraq in the 1990s raise questions about 
whether the values of humanity are receiving their due regard in proportionality 
assessments by military decision-makers. 
            Chapter two provided a thorough examination of general principles of 
international law. It demonstrated that these principles are particularly useful in filling 
gaps in international law; in unifying different areas of international law, like IHL and 
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IEL; in helping to develop international law, just as the last decades have seen the 
increasing development of a more environmentally conscious international community; 
and in interpreting existing international law. This chapter helps to frame the later 
discussion in chapter six, in which general principles of law are used to interlink IHL and 
the principles of IEL in order to achieve the intended protections for civilians and the 
environment in armed conflict.  
            Chapters four and five turned to consideration of IEL. They examined the links 
between IEL and sustainable development, a concept that is also clearly linked to armed 
conflict. These chapters focused primarily on the two principles of international law I 
proposed employing to guide proportionality assessments under IHL: intergenerational 
equity and the precautionary principle. Together, these principles raise awareness about 
the importance of considering not only short-term but long-term consequences of our 
decisions. The current world already faces problems caused by past generations who 
failed to consider the long-term consequences of their choices, such as climate change, 
ozone depletion, acid rain, deforestation and the extinction of species. While there may 
be scientific uncertainty at times as to the exact nature or degree of harm that might be 
realized, if actions are taken without adequate regard to the consequences, it may be too 
late to undo the damage. For example, the environment and people of Vietnam continue, 
even four decades after the Vietnam War, to suffer the effects of chemical defoliants 
used.
660
 The dictates of military necessity would have to be exceptionally high to find this 
type of action acceptable in light of modern values of humanity and the environment.  
            Chapter six takes these principles of IEL and looks at the application of IEL in 
armed conflicts. While traditional approaches to IHL saw it as displacing all other 
international law as lex specialis, it is clear that modern approaches no longer accept this 
assertion. In particular, the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion demonstrates that, 
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during armed conflict, the rules and customs of IHL do not operate to the exclusion of all 
others. Instead, other areas of law, such as human rights and IEL, continue to operate and 
provide guidance in the application and interpretation of IHL. As such, there is no reason 
not to use intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle to guide decision-
makers’ analyses of proportionality for a proposed attack. 
            The second half of chapter six, therefore, took existing IHL and applied it to the 
Kosovo cluster munitions and Iraq depleted uranium examples using the principles of 
IEL to guide this application. The markers of long-term thinking, serious harm and 
scientific uncertainty provide greater detail and understanding of the considerations of 
humanity being balanced against military necessity. Furthermore, they provide greater 
clarity against which to evaluate the decisions of military actors to ensure they are 
adequately performing their obligations in conducting these assessments justly and not 
disregarding humanitarian considerations. The analysis suggests that a proportionality 
assessment, guided by principles of IEL, might actually provide greater protection for the 
environment and civilians that the specific provisions dedicated to environmental 
protection with their strict and high threshold. 
            While this thesis makes a strong case for using principles of IEL to guide 
proportionality assessments in IHL, there are some limitations to the research that must 
be acknowledged. An important limitation of this work is that it focuses on international 
armed conflicts as opposed to internal or non-international conflicts. The distinction 
between international and internal conflicts remains complicated and at times 
controversial. Furthermore, the content of customary law applying to internal armed 
conflicts is less clear and the conventional law less developed. Thus, restricting the 
approach of this thesis, for now, to international armed conflicts allows for a more 
straightforward analysis. However, it is postulated that similar benefits would arise by 
using IEL to provide content to the IHL governing non-international armed conflict.   
            A second limitation of this thesis is that it only considers two principles of IEL. 
These two principles were chosen because they consider both short-term and long-term 
harms as well as scientific uncertainty. These considerations are important when dealing 
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with the environment and human health, but they are also highly relevant in armed 
conflicts, particularly with regards the types of weapons used. However, there are 
potentially other principles of IEL that would be equally applicable. For example, 
sustainable development was discussed briefly in this thesis, but a more in-depth look at 
its links with armed conflict and the environment could provide insight on further means 
of improving protections for civilians and the environment in wartime. The “polluter 
pays” principle which places the burden of remediating polluted areas should be assumed 
by the person responsible for causing the pollution also has the potential to be useful in 
redressing situations of harms from past conflicts. Similarly, there are also other areas of 
international law that may provide principles that could prove useful in IHL and in the 
protection of the environment. The strong links between human rights, the environment 
and armed conflict have already been noted and emerging human rights to development 
and a healthy environment could influence decision-making in armed conflicts.  
            A final limitation is that this thesis does not delve in to the issue of implementing 
the proposed approach within the international community. It develops the justification 
for the approach and applies it to real examples, taking this as a natural ending point and 
leaving for future research the political, legal and civil society issues that would likely 
have to be faced in order to see the approach fully implemented and realized in practice. 
            Other areas for future research include extending considerations of the operation 
of these laws and principles to non-state actors who increasingly take on greater roles, 
both directly and indirectly, in armed conflicts: for instance, the increasing use of private 
military companies and the role of arms manufacturers. Exploring the extension of 
protections for the environment in internal armed conflicts is also an important avenue to 
pursue. Future research might also examine the means of reconciling principles of 
sustainability and sustainable development with the inherently destructive nature of 
armed conflict. 
            In sum, military necessity in recent conflicts has appeared to be taking precedence 
over concerns for the protection of civilians and the environment. The approach proposed 
in this thesis has the potential to regain the proper balance between military necessity and 
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humanitarian concerns. It has the potential to save lives and preserve the planet for 
generations to come. Ultimately, it has the power to restore humanity to humanitarian 
law. 
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